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Abstract
Most organizations are aware that threats from trusted insiders pose a great risk to
their organization and are difficult to protect against. Auditing is recognized as an
effective technique for detecting malicious activity. However, current auditing methods
are typically applied with a one-size-fits-all approach and may not be an appropriate
mitigation strategy for the insider threat.
This research develops a 4-step methodology for designing a customized auditing
template for a Microsoft Windows XP® operating system. Two tailoring methods are
presented which evaluate both by category and and by configuration. Also developed are
various metrics and weighting factors as a mechanism to evaluate auditing effectiveness
for the purpose of optimizing the template according to organizational security
requirements. Various industry standard auditing templates are evaluated against a
custom designed template. Results indicate that a customized auditing template tailored
for an insider threat scenario is more effective at detecting insider malicious activities.
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DEVELOPMENT OF A METHODOLOGY FOR CUSTOMIZING INSIDER
THREAT AUDITING ON A MICROSOFT WINDOWS XP® PROFESSIONAL
OPERATING SYSTEM

1. I. Introduction
This research introduces a methodology for developing a customized auditing
template for a computer workstation. The methodology is designed to tailor the auditing
settings for a workstation using the Microsoft Windows XP® Operating System according
to the unique organizational security requirements in regards to an insider threat.
1.1. Research Motivation
Information has always been a critical resource and key ingredient for decisionmaking abilities. The rapid growth of microcomputers and distributed networks has
significantly increased the amount of information available to decision makers in
electronic form. One drawback of the availability of widespread information in electronic
form has been the inherent complications of protecting that information. The protection
of information is an extremely critical area of study.
Threats to an organization’s information resources can be classified in three
categories: (1) outside threats, (2) inside threats, and (3) natural threats. Most
organizations are aware of threats to their information resources and do what they can to
protect them. Natural threats such as natural disasters and power losses are generally
relatively simple to understand and require planning and procedures to mitigate, such as
backup strategies. Outsider threats are more complicated and are commonly countered
with technological solutions such as firewalls, Intrusion Detection Systems, and antivirus
1

software. The threat from trusted insiders can be significant to an organization, and
significantly more difficult to mitigate. One approach to deal with the insider threat is to
implement measures to detect the malicious actions that they perform. One technique to
accomplish this is by auditing their actions. If this auditing is properly performed, then
insider activities that stray from the norm can be recognized and investigated. One
resource available to accomplish this is by invoking the auditing capabilities available in
Microsoft Windows XP®. The Windows XP® Operating System provides a wide variety
of auditing capabilities which can be used to detect potential malicious insider activities.
Although these auditing capabilities exist, they are not enabled by default. An
organization needs to configure client workstations to audit events based on its identified
security requirements. Determining the events to audit is a difficult process. Currently,
auditing configurations that are available are inherently tied to one-size-fits-all security
templates. (e.g. NIST EC, NIST SSLF, NSA SNAC, etc.) There exists a need for a method
which assists an organization in tailoring its auditing based on its unique security
requirements.
1.2. Problem Statement
Organizations are aware of threats to their information resources, and spend
countless hours and money attempting to protect them. Most of their efforts are
concentrated on countermeasures aimed at protecting against threats from outside the
organization, but organizations often overlook protecting information against the insider
threat. The threat from malicious insiders is substantial, and worth serious consideration.
One strategy to protect against malicious insiders is detecting their activity through

2

auditing. This is usually done within organizations, and usually blindly through the use of
preexisting auditing configurations. Currently, there exists no defined methodology for
creating a customized auditing template based on organizational security requirements.
1.3. Assumptions
In order to use the methodology developed in this study, an organization needs to
have identified security requirements so that it can properly address them. This is
accomplished by performing a risk analysis. Before applying the results of this thesis, it is
assumed that a risk analysis has been accomplished already.
1.4. Scope
There are currently many existing threats to an organization’s information
infrastructure. The focus of this study is on the insider threat because it is difficult to
mitigate. Auditing can be extremely effective at detecting insider threats if configured
properly. This study is limited to the use of local workstation auditing with local users
only.
1.5. Overview
This research has developed a 4-step methodology which when used to creates a
customized auditing template that is more beneficial than using any preexisting auditing
templates available to support security configuration templates. It includes the steps
required for setting up and conducting this process. The methodology includes two
separate methods for creating an auditing template and provides a method for evaluating
each.

3

1.6. Thesis Overview
This chapter defines the research goal and provides a brief summary of the
motivation for developing an organizational customized auditing template. Chapter 2
presents a literature review and provides background information that supports this
research. Chapter 3 describes the methodology, experimental setup, and calculations used
to conduct this research. Chapter 4 presents the experiment results and an analysis of
those results. Chapter 5 provides conclusions from this research and recommendations for
additional research in the area of creating auditing templates.

4

2. II. Literature Review
2.1. Chapter Overview
This chapter presents the concepts and current trends of insider threats. It also
presents the current uses of audit logs to monitor workstation activity inside an enterprise
network to enable an organization to recognize insider threat indicators. The first section
presents the objectives of information security. The second section offers a definition of
insider threat including its characteristics and types. It then discusses current trends in the
area of detecting and mitigating the insider threat. Then various insider attack methods
and the ways of identifying those methods are discussed. The third section summarizes
the history of auditing to monitor and identify insider behaviors and its potential role in
identifying the characteristics of insider threats. The final section discusses the current
uses of auditing within the workstation environment, its capabilities, and its various
implementations.
2.2. Objectives of Information Security
Protecting an enterprise network against both outside and inside attacks involves
balancing information system usability with three main security objectives:
confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA). The National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) describes these three objectives in the Federal Information Processing
Standards Publication (FIPS PUB) 199, which were originally established as part of the
Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 in addition to providing guidance
on the categorization of information systems. [1, 2]. These three main objectives are ideal
as the main focus areas that an organization should consider when protecting its
5

information resource assets, however they need to be balanced with usability. It is
important that information owners within organizations understand these objectives so
they can better achieve a balance between the security of their organizations information
and its useability. Now that we have an understanding of the need for the security
objectives, we define them.
2.2.1. Confidentiality
Confidentiality is “preserving authorized restrictions on information access and
disclosure, including means for protecting personal privacy and proprietary
information… [1]” It refers to the privacy of information, or more specifically which
individuals, entities, or processes are authorized access to that information at what times
[3]. Access includes viewing, processing, displaying, processing, and transmitting the
information. For example, at a medical facility, only patients and medical staff, who
require access to perform their jobs, can access patient medical records. Ensuring
confidentiality is critical to an organization because the loss of confidentiality, which can
lead to the unauthorized disclosure of critical or sensitive information, can lead to severe
economic losses or loss of life within an organization [1, 4].
2.2.2. Integrity
Integrity is the assurance that “data has not been changed, destroyed, or lost in an
unauthorized or accidental manner” [3]. It means that trusted information is expected to
be modified only by duly authorized individuals. For example, in an educational
institution only authorized staff, such as the registrar, should be able to modify a
student’s grades, and a professor should be able to view but not modify them. Ensuring
6

integrity within an organization is also critical because the loss of integrity, and the
ensuing unauthorized modification or destruction of information, can result in the serious
loss of organizational effectiveness, or serious economic loss [1, 4].
2.2.3. Availability
Availability is “ensuring timely and reliable access to and use of information and
information services…” [1] The loss of availability results in the disruption of access to
or use of information or an information system [1, 2]. Information must be available to
authorized persons, entities, or devices whenever they are required according to the
information system design [3]. Normally, a premium is put on preserving the availability
of the most critical (or valuable) information. For example, even the temporary
unavailability of a financial company’s databases might result in losses of millions of
dollars. Therefore, the company must put great importance on preserving the availability
of its databases. An organization should consider allocating appropriate resources to
protect the availability of resources based on information value to safeguard against loss
of that information.
2.3. Insider Threat
Insider threat is an often misunderstood and overlooked phenomenon. It is
substantially damaging to an organization and requires attention and understanding if it is
to be protected against and mitigated.
2.3.1. Definition of Insider Threat
The following section defines insider threat and identifies its characteristics. In a
2004 National Threat Assessment Center Report done by the U.S. Secret Service and
7

CERT Coordination Center Carnegie Mellon University, a comprehensive definition of
malicious insider threat was presented:
Current or former employees or contractors who intentionally exceeded or
misused an authorized level of access to networks, systems or data in a manner
that targeted a specific individual or affected the security of the organization’s
data, systems and/or daily business operations [5].

The term insider threat can be determined to refer to the potential damage to an
organization caused by the actions of one or more of its trusted agents. The activities
causing damage can be intentionally malicious acts or simple user mistakes. Every
organization should conduct a careful analysis of its insider threat situation and
implement appropriate countermeasures to safeguard their information and information
systems.
2.3.2. Insider Threat Trends
The recent impact of reported insider threat activities has been significant. In a
2005 Carnegie Mellon Insider Threat Study, it was found that eighty-one percent of
organizations, who reported insider activity, experienced financial losses ranging from
$500 to more that $10,000,000 [6]. These reported losses do not include implicit costs,
such as lost future sales or loss of market capitalization, which are difficult or impossible
to measure but devastating to an organization [7]. Figure 2.1 shows a trend of decreased
reported network intrusions, which could be due to an increased awareness and more
advanced technology to defend against malicious activity. It could also mean that
organizations are reluctant to report intrusions, primarily because of the bad publicity and
potential lost revenues associated with the bad publicity [6]. Figure 2.2 illustrates that in
8

2005 eighty-seven percent of organizations are conducting security audits, which is up
five percent from 2004, which may indicate that they are becoming more aware of the
benefits of these audits in helping to detect potential intrusions [7-9].

Figure 2.1: Attack trends [7]
2.3.3. Insider Threat Characteristics
Insiders have the potential to pose a significantly high threat to an organization
because they are trusted agents. They have knowledge of, and access to, sensitive inside
information, such as the organization’s network design, security procedures, and
organizational systems and databases, which potentially gives them opportunity and
know-how to either damage or steal information [6]. They are also privy to information
9

about any security vulnerabilities the organization might have. Often they hold, or can
easily gain, higher privileges such as administrative or super-user rights, which makes
them considerably more capable of performing malicious acts. A recent study by
Carnegie Mellon looked at case studies and discovered that 77% of the malicious insider
activity was attributed to full-time employees, and 86% held technical positions. These
technical positions included system administrators (38%), programmers (21%), engineers
(14%), and IT specialists (14%) [6].

Figure 2.2: Organizations Conducting Security Audits [7]
2.3.4. Types of Insider Threats
The threat existing from insiders depends on the intent and activity of the insider
and is classified by three types: normal, abnormal, and malevolent. Table 2.1 describes
the three types of insiders, the activities that they exhibit, and their threat levels. Normal
insider activities typically do not pose a threat because their activities consist of normal
day-to-day use of organizational information resources without any abnormal behaviors
10

or situations. Abnormal insider activities are “out of the ordinary” events, and can include
routine errors. These routine errors can render a system vulnerable, which can cause a
breach in Confidentiality, Integrity, or Availability [10]. Examples of this are system
administrators forgetting to delete accounts of users who have left the company, users
leaving themselves logged into their workstations, or users using weak passwords for
their accounts. These types of routine errors pose a substantial vulnerability to the
information resources of an organization to intrusion by third parties that take advantage
of the weaknesses exposed by the abnormal insider activities.
Malevolent insider activity is activity by individuals with malicious intent of
stealing or damaging the information of the organization, which poses the greatest threat
[10]. The motives of these insiders vary but are most often related to revenge. Negative
work-related events often trigger these threats. In a recent study, United States Secret
Service and CERT Program Software Engineering Institute of Carnegie Mellon
University found that “in 92% of the cases, a specific event or series of events triggered
the insider’s actions” [6]. These events include termination of employment (47%),
dispute with a former employer (20%), and demotion or transfer (13%) [6].

An

organization should know the characteristics of each of these types of insider threats in
order to plan an appropriate mitigation strategy.

11

Table 2.1: Insider Activity Types
Insider Activity Type
Normal

Activity
Typical Behavior

Threat
Limited

Abnormal

Routine Errors

Substantial Threat

Malevolent

Malicious Intent

Greatest Threat

2.3.5. Attack Methods
The vulnerabilities most often exploited by an insider are the lack of, or the
ineffectiveness of, controls and checks to prevent an insider from removing sensitive data
from their work areas [11]. In a 2005 study conducted by the U.S. Secret Service and
Carnegie Mellon’s Computer Emergency Response Team Coordination Center found that
a large majority of the reported incidents were not technically sophisticated. They found
that 61% of the reported malicious insider actions were executed with no technical
sophistication using simple attack methods such as legitimate user commands,
information exchanges, or physical attacks [6]. In 60% of these cases, the insider
compromised an account to carry out the attack, including the use of another user’s
username and password, or the use of an unauthorized account created by the insider.
These attacks were successful primarily due to systemic vulnerabilities in
technology and/or policies, processes, or procedures, such as [6]:
•
•
•
•

Coarse access control restrictions
Sloppy accounting procedures
Infrequent or non-existent monitoring procedures
Insufficient physical access controls

These attacks were successful primarily due to systematic vulnerabilities in
technology and/or policies, processes, or procedures, such as
12

•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Scripts or malicious programs
Autonomous agents
Toolkits
Flooding
Probing
Scanning
Spoofing

Although malicious insiders usually use relatively uncomplicated methods in
executing attacks, the very same lack of sophistication can actually make detection more
difficult due to its resemblance to normal day-to-day activity in the organization. In order
for organizations to detect malicious insiders, they need to identify any indicators that can
alert them to possible insider actions.
2.3.6. Identifying Possible Insider Threats
The threats posed to an organization both from the inside as well as the outside
have become more evident in recent years. Studies indicate that most organizations are
becoming increasingly more aware of the importance and usefulness of technology used
to combat malicious activity such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems, and antivirus
solutions. In the 2005 CSI/FBI survey, 97% of the respondents reported using firewalls,
72% used intrusion detection systems, and 96% used antivirus software” [7]. These
technologies mostly have perimeter defenses in mind, which are sufficient at detecting or
preventing external attempts to access, by-pass, or damage organizational information or
information systems. However, they do very little to detect insider threats. In a 2005
Carnegie Mellon University study, it was discovered that the majority of insider attacks
were not detected by security personnel [6]. Furthermore, the malicious activity was only
detected because of a noticeable change in the system performance, or because the
13

system simply became unavailable [6]. In the 2004 Carnegie Mellon E-crime Watch
Survey, nearly half of the organizations reporting insider e-crimes reported that they were
uncovered accidentally and not as a result of security policies [12]. These studies provide
evidence to support the requirement to use more resources than perimeter defenses to
identify attacks especially against insider threats. Organizations must develop effective
policies and procedures to achieve better protection against the insider threat. One
potentially useful and often overlooked method is the use of auditing.
2.4. Auditing
Auditing is a readily available resource that an organization can use to protect
against the insider threat. First it must be understood, and its capabilities explored by
investigating its background and various roles and uses.
2.4.1. Definition and Evolution of Auditing
Auditing, which originates from Latin meaning, “To hear”, has been in existence
for ages [13]. The purposes of an audit are to provide an independent verification, reduce
errors in record-keeping, reduce misappropriation of assets, and prevent or detect fraud.
The roots of auditing are summarized by an accounting historian named Richard Brown
who stated, “Whenever the advance of civilization brought about the necessity of one
man being entrusted to the extent with the property of another, the advisability of some
kind of check upon the fidelity of the former would become apparent” [13]. Historians
believe that formal record-keeping systems were used to account for transactions as far
back as 4000 BC [13]. Throughout history, people have used different forms of auditing.
It was considered a prudent measure to ensure that trust was not broken, regardless of if it
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was intentionally or not. As President Ronald Reagan stated in his farewell address,
referring to our relationship with Russia after the end of the cold war, Ronald Reagan
said, “It's still trust, but verify. It's still play, but cut the cards. It's still watch closely. And
don't be afraid to see what you see” [14].
More recently, auditing has been identified as a critical element in the maintaining
of information security. Auditing information systems is defined by the National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST), the federal authority in information security
standards and guidelines, as “the review and analysis of management, operational, and
technical controls…. In which valuable information about activity on a computer system
can be obtained” [15]. To keep information systems secure, the United States Federal
Government has enacted the Computer Security Act of 1987. This act established
minimum security practices for federal information systems to improve security and
privacy. It also assigned NIST, with the assistance of the National Security
Administration (NSA), the responsibility of developing standards and guidelines required
to implement efficient security and privacy in federal information systems [16].
The NIST Special Publication 800-30, Risk Management Guide for Information
Technology Systems, provides guidance on the use of auditing to assist in the assurance
of an organization’s information and information systems. After security-related events,
the evaluation of audit logs and the monitoring and tracking of abnormalities in systems
are key elements for detecting and recovering from security breaches [17].
DoD instruction 8500.2 mandates that the collection and retention of all audit data
be performed by all heads of DoD, as information owners, for the support of technical
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analysis relating to misuse, penetration reconstruction, or other investigations [4]. This
instruction also mandates that “an automated, continuous on-line monitoring and audit
trail creation capability be deployed with the capability to immediately alert personnel of
any unusual or inappropriate activity with potential Information Assurance (IA)
implications…” [4]
2.4.2. Auditing Policy
In order to effectively use auditing to achieve security objectives, a welldeveloped auditing policy needs to be created. The baseline for implementing a good
auditing policy is to start with a good security policy. An important part of the security
policy is to identify the roles and responsibilities of individuals within the organization. If
those roles and responsibilities are not identified, and their duties are not clearly defined,
then identifying abnormal behaviors of individuals performing those roles through the
use of auditing becomes increasingly difficult. The policy should also define the role of
auditing, how auditing is performed, what activities need to be identified, and how
particular anomalies will be recognized. Also, specific tasks need to be defined, such as
who will review the logs, how often they will be reviewed, how long they will be stored,
and appropriate reactions to actions found. In a recent study, CSO Magazine and
Carnegie Mellon University Software Engineering Institute's CERT Coordination Center
found that only half of organizations have a formal process or system in place for
tracking e-crime attempts [12]. Without a formal process or system in place for tracking
e-crime attempts, an organization may not even know if its network has been
compromised.
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2.4.3. The Role of Auditing in An Enterprise
Many occurrences happen within an organization’s information infrastructure that
can be recognized as potential insider threat activity. Most of these occurrences can be
logged within the organization, and then observed if the audit logs are regularly reviewed
by security administrators. As was presented by RAND in its 2004 workshop, there is a
taxonomy of observables useable for recognizing characteristics of potentially malicious
insiders (Figure 2.3). As seen in the center of the figure, most of the sub-categories which
fall under the category Cyber Actions can be recognized through auditing because most
are performed on information systems that have auditing capabilities. Auditing provides a
means to accomplish these observations in several areas such as individual
accountability, reconstruction of events, intrusion detection, and problem analysis [15].

Figure 2.3: Taxonomy of Observables [18]
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2.4.3.1. Individual Accountability
Managers can use auditing as a technical measure to help maintain individual
accountability. They can help promote good user behavior by ensuring that users know
they are personally accountable for their actions and that their actions are tracked by audit
logs. Users likely will not attempt to circumvent security policies if they know that their
actions are recorded in audit logs, which are subject to periodic review. Audit trails can
be used in addition to logical access controls to restrict the use of system resources, to
analyze user activities and ensure they have not misused their authorized access or
attempted to gain unauthorized access. For example, if an individual has access to
sensitive data, such as plans to a new aircraft, audit logs could reveal that those plans had
been accessed and printed extensively for weeks before quitting, indicating that the
individual misused his/her authorized access to commit a malicious act [15]. As indicated
in the RAND study, the malicious insider normally follows a deliberate decision making
process, which is presented in the spiral model flowchart in Figure 2.4. Once the
malicious insider reaches the risk analysis step, in which he/she assesses the risk of
detection prior to committing the attack, he/she then decides whether to continue to
deliver the attack. If the individual knows that the risk of detection is high, there is a
greater chance that he/she might decide to stop the attack. This is how auditing, if made
known throughout the organization can serve as a deterrent to malicious insider activity.
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Figure 2.4: Spiral Model Flowchart [18]
2.4.3.2. Reconstruction of Events
Another benefit of auditing is the ability to reconstruct an event after detecting
unusual activity, routine errors, or abnormal insider activity, which could present a
substantial threat to the organization. A forensic team could also be used to examine audit
trails in order to reconstruct events to assist in solving problems [15]. Reviewing audit
trails can help determine the event source and the cause of the event, which in turn allows
for an easier assessment of the damage. The audit trail can also point to whether the
situation was user induced or system created, and possible reasons that it occurred. A
good knowledge of the conditions that existed at the time of an event, as well as
determining the preexisting conditions that led to the event can aid in avoiding its
occurrence in the future.
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2.4.3.3. Intrusion Detection
The role of security auditing in an enterprise network can be extremely important
because it may often be the only indication of a security breach. If configured to record
the appropriate information, an organization can use audit logs to assist in intrusion
detection. Intrusion detection is normally considered a real time solution. Although audit
logs are not typically considered a real-time solution, advanced auditing can examine
audit records as they are created, and generate an alert of the potential intrusion. Many
host-based intrusion detection systems work in this manner. After-the-fact, intrusions
can be analyzed in depth by using audit logs to determine what happened, and when it
occurred, and where the intrusion originated from to ascertain the damage caused by the
intrusion [15].

The 2005 CSI/FBI survey found that once an insider attack was detected,

system logs were the most prevalent method of identifying the malicious insider. In 76%
of these cases, even though the insiders took steps to conceal their identities, the insider
was identified using several types of logs as can be seen in Figure 2.5 [7].
Types of Logs Used To Identify Insider Attackers
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Figure 2.5: Types of Logs Used to Identify Insider Attacks [6]
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A disturbing trend in the annual surveys was that even though over half of the
respondents surveyed held the position of Chief Information Officer, Chief Security
Officer, Chief Information Security Officer, Security Officer, or System Administrator
(Figure 2.6), an average of 37% of them did not know if their company had experienced
computer crime incidents from the inside (Figure 2.7). With a good auditing policy and
regular audit reviews, organizations can detect and stop computer crime incidents before
significant damage is inflicted.

Figure 2.6: 2005 CSI/FBI Respondents by Job Description [7]

Figure 2.7: Number of Incidents from the Inside [7]
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Robert Hanssen, an FBI Supervisory Special Agent was found guilty of what
some call “possibly the worst intelligence disaster in US history” [18], when he
downloaded large quantities of information from the FBI Automated Case Support
System. He also searched the Bureau’s system for any information on his detection,
installed unauthorized software on his office workstation, and even hacked onto a Bureau
colleague’s workstation. After the fact, audit logs and trails were used to trace his activity
and the damage he caused. If the FBI had monitored these audit logs regularly, or in real
time, they likely would have caught Mr. Hanssen sooner and minimized any damage he
caused [18]. After he was caught, he was quoted as saying, “If I thought the risk of
detection was very great, I would have never done it.” As a result of his case, the
Department of Justice reported the following in its after action report [19]:
The FBI should implement measures to improve computer security, including:
(a) Establishing an audit program to detect and give notice of unauthorized
access to sensitive cases on a “real-time” basis
(b) Establishing an audit program designed to track when employees or
contractors are using the FBI’s computer systems to determine whether
they are under investigation…
In piecing together the chain of events of an intrusion to determine what occurred
in an after-the-fact analysis, audit logs play a major role. The Microsoft Security Risk
Management Guide describes a six step approach to follow when investigating incidents.
Figure 2.8 provides a graphical representation of the six step process. Auditing plays a
key role in the fourth step called “determine cause” which is identifying the cause of
damage to a network or individual workstation. A thorough review of the audit logs on
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the affected system, as well as other influential devices around them, could give valuable
insight into where the attack originated [20].
2.4.3.4. Problem Analysis
Auditing can be used for problem analysis in quasi real-time to identify potential
problems in system performance. Quasi real-time auditing of systems can monitor
performance status and allow timely reaction to possible critical changes or system halts
due to operator input errors or system errors. These indicators pinpoint the cause of errors
and allow the organization either to remedy the situation before experiencing

Figure 2.8: Incident Response Process [20]
adverse performance, or to find the root of the problem and solve it. For example, quasi
real-time auditing can alert a system administrator when a computer hard drive is filling
up unusually fast. This early warning gives the system administrator an opportunity to
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investigate the cause of the problem and potentially solve it before the system crashes. A
thorough investigation can provide information to prevent future occurrences.
2.5. Related Research
One of the largest areas of research in the area of detecting insider threats has
been in the area of intrusion detection. Detection techniques have largely focused in the
area of alert correlation analysis. Because of the high amounts of alerts generated by
intrusion detection devices and audit logs, various methods have been developed to
correlate audit logs and Intrusion Detection System logs to make them easier to manage
by security professionals. One area of alert correlation is with the probabilistic approach
in which alerts that match closely are fused together in groups of similar events [32, 33].
By matching similarities in these events and then putting them into a hierarchy of
similarities, the number of alerts are reduced to a level that is more manageable [34].
Another area of alert correlation is rule based alert correlation, also known as the datamining approach [23, 35, 36]. In this method, once the alerts are correlated they are
scoured for sets of rules based on known attacks. A particular known attack is broken
down into steps, identifiable by sets of rules. This approach greatly reduces the number of
false alarms, but only works for misuse detection and is not effective for anomaly
detection [32].
These research undertakings seem useful in addressing the problems caused by
large numbers of intrusion detections being done on large enterprise networks. They
address ways of automating the task of sorting through them for indicators of attacks. A
particular area that doesn’t appear to have been researched recently is in the area of log
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consistency. Specifically, what can be done within an organization using existing
workstation auditing, in conjunction with other available technologies, to identify
potential insider threats?

Research on the configuration of auditing on individual

workstation to better identify insider threats is needed so that it can be known that the
logs being correlated and scoured are filled with appropriate audit events. That way it
can be known that they can detect possible attacks or malicious behavior. This is what
this thesis discusses.
2.6. Types and Categories of Auditing
In order to understand the methodology presented in this thesis, the current types
of auditing being used, the auditing categories, and how they function within a Microsoft
Windows XP® operating system must first be understood.
2.6.1. Workstation Auditing Overview
An organization’s audit policy determines the security events to record in order to
capture enough details about user, administrator, or system activity. Administrators can
monitor security-related activity, such as when a subject accesses an object, when users
or administrators log on or off workstations, or if a user attempts to change a system’s
security policy. The audited events are instrumental in identifying an insider event.
Failing to collect key activities hinders the ability to identify potentially malicious
insiders. On the other hand, capturing too many activities fills the audit logs with less
valuable entries and complicates the filtering process in addition to escalating the cost.
Therefore, an organization must plan for a balance between capturing all events and the

25

minimum required number of activities. In addition, the organization must decide which
types of audit logs to monitor and which categories to audit within those logs [21].
Figure 2.9 shows the alert stream complexities phenomenon in which the number
of events captured is directly proportional to a larger event space, which induces cost in
both storage space and difficulty in filtering appropriate events [22]. This problem is
known as alert flooding, in which a large number of alerts are presented to the operator,
who has difficulty coping with the load [23]. This phenomenon also occurs with Intrusion
Detection Systems.

Figure 2.9: Alert Stream Complexities [22]
Maintaining audit logs is a complicated undertaking. With so many users,
administrators, and systems being audited the amounts and sizes of the logs can be
overwhelming. Since accurately monitoring administrator activities is extremely
important and administrators have the capability of manipulating the logs to possibly
cover their tracks, it is a good idea to log all activity to a remote logging server. A remote
logging server also makes maintaining the audit logs easier.
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2.6.2. Remote Logging
With auditing enabled on workstation computers, the default configuration is to
log all audited events to the local machine. In a Windows XP® environment, it is logged
to the System32/Configuration directory as an “.evt” file. An inside attacker with
sufficient skills can delete these files to cover his tracks, so a good practice is to set up
remote security auditing, or logging to a remote computer on the network. A Syslog
Server approach accomplishes this by the use of various third party software such as
NTsyslog or Kiwi Syslog Daemon. The logs stored on a Syslog server should be
protected from access by anyone except security personnel [24]. Another advantage of
using a remote logging server is that it makes regular automated or manual reviews of
these logs less complicated. Also, the storage and backup of these audit logs is easier
with the use of a robust server with a lot of storage space and a scheduled backup policy.
2.6.3. Types of Audit Logs
Within most of the Microsoft Windows® operating systems there are three main
types of audit logs. They are the application log, the system log, and the security log.
Table 2.2 provides a description of each type. On Windows XP® systems the default
configuration disables all security auditing. Security administrators must therefore
carefully select which categories of events and what types of auditing they want to audit
on their organizations workstations [25].
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Table 2.2: Types of Audit Logs [26]
Log Type

Description

Application The application log contains events logged by commercial off-theshelf applications, and user programs. For example, a database
program might record a file error in the application log. Program
developers generally decide which events to monitor in this log.
System

The system log contains events logged by system components such as
system processes and device drivers. For example, a device driver
failure, hardware failure, or failure of a system component to load
during startup(such as a service) is recorded in the system log.

Security

The security log can record security events such as changes in user’s
privileges, changes in the audit policy, file and directory access, and
system logons and logoffs. For example, when logon auditing is
enabled, an event is recorded in the security log each time a user
attempts to log onto the computer.

System and application logging are enabled by the operating system by default.
They are both very useful for troubleshooting purposes, but are seldom used in
identifying malicious acts. Security auditing captures security events such as
unauthorized access, malicious attacks, or unusual occurrences that might warrant
investigation [24]. Modification of the local policy to disable or limit security logging
requires administrator privileges. By default, any user on a system can view the
application and system logs, but only administrators can view the security log. This log,
if configured to audit the correct events, is the most useful log to gather information
about activity during an incident response. There are nine categories of security auditing,
each with separate characteristics and the ability to capture different types of events. Each
of these categories can be set to either: No auditing, Success Auditing, Failure Auditing,
or both Success and Failure Auditing [27]. Table 2.3 explains each in more detail.
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Table 2.3: Auditing Settings [26]
Setting
Description
No Auditing No audit entry is generated for the associated action.
Success
An audit entry is generated when the requested action succeeds. For
Auditing example, a user attempts to log in and is successful it will be logged.
Failure
An audit entry is generated when the requested action fails. For
Auditing example, a user attempts to log in and is unsuccessful it will be logged.
Success and An audit entry is generated either when a requested action succeeds or
Failure
fails. For example, a user attempts to login and either succeeds or
Auditing fails, it will be logged either way.

2.6.4. Categories of Audit Logs
In most Microsoft Operating Systems, specifically Microsoft Windows XP®
Professional, there are nine categories of auditable events configurable for auditing.
Table 2.4 briefly explains each category. The following sections describes the uses of
these configurations as well as an overview of implications of their settings.
2.6.4.1. Audit Account Logon Events
This category is designed for the auditing of remote logons. In this category,
events for logging on or logging off remotely are logged by the computer that is used to
validate the account. An example of this is a domain controller logging all logons to
workstations or shared resources such as file servers or shared printers within its domain.
For a local machine account, the local machine logs local logins into this category for a
local account.
2.6.4.2. Audit Account Management
In this category, events are logged tracking attempts to create new users or
groups, rename users or groups, enable or disable user accounts, change account
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Table 2.4: Auditing Categories [28]
Category
Audit account logon
events
Audit account
management
Audit directory service
access
Audit logon events

Audit object access

Audit policy change
Audit privilege use
Audit process tracking
Audit system events

Effect
Audits logon attempts to a local account on a computer.
If the user account is a domain account, this event also
appears on the domain controller.
Audits the creation, modification, and deletion of user
and group accounts, in conjunction with password
changes and resets.
Audits access to objects in the Active Directory service.
Audits attempts to log on to workstations and member
servers.
Audits attempts to access an object such as a file,
folder, registry key, or printer that has defined audit
settings within that object’s system access control list
(SACL).
Audits any change to a user rights assignment, audit,
account, or trust policies.
Audits each instance that a user exercises a user right,
such as changing the system time.
Audits application behavior such as program starts or
terminations.
Audits computer system events such as startup and
shutdown and events that affect system security or the
security log.

passwords, and enable auditing for account management events. If this category is
enabled for auditing, administrators can track events to detect malicious, accidental, and
authorized creation of user and group accounts. This category is best suited for keeping
an eye on the actions of administrators to make sure they are performing within the
parameters of the organization security policy.
2.6.4.3. Audit Logon Events
When auditing “logon events”, the system records events involving the creation
and destruction of logon sessions to its local machine regardless of whether the local
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machine is on the network or not. These events occur on the computer accessed, as
opposed to the one that validates the account and may not necessarily be the one accessed
as in Audit Account Logon Events. For example, if a network logon was performed to
access a share on a file server, these events are generated on the file server itself. Without
selecting this category for auditing, it is difficult or impossible to determine which user
has either accessed or attempted to access computers in an organization. The events in
this category are useful for detecting a malicious user unplugging a workstation from the
network, breaking into it, then attempting to gain access to the network.
2.6.4.4. Audit Object Access
Enabling object access auditing records the events of a user accessing an object,
such as a file, folder, registry key, or printer that has a specified System Access Control
List (SACL) configured. By itself this policy setting does not log any events, because
each individual object audited must have a SACL configured. A SACL is comprised of
Access Control Entries (ACE). Each ACE contains three pieces of information [21]:
•

The security principal (user, computer, or group) to be audited when they
attempt to access the object.

•

The specific access type to be audited (such as read data, write data, delete,
or full control), called an access mask.

•

A flag to indicate whether to audit failed access events, successful access
events, or both.

Organizations should carefully consider the actions to capture when they
configure SACLs, because they can be extremely useful in detecting particular insider
threats based on security goals. For example, it is a good practice to enable tracking of
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user writes and appends on executable files to track when they are changed or replaced,
because computer viruses, worms, and Trojan horses typically target executable files.
Additionally, tracking user accesses and modifications of sensitive documents can help to
determine possible unauthorized access or malicious activity [29].
2.6.4.5. Audit Policy Change
This category configures auditing of every incident of a change to user’s rights
assignment policies, trust policies, or changes to the audit policy itself. This category
assists in monitoring the activities of administrators. Any configuring or changing of any
of the workstation or server policies within an organization should be investigated to
determine if it was authorized or not. This category identifies malicious users attempt to
circumvent auditing by changing the audit policy or clearing the audit logs, which is a
common technique used to cover up any malicious insider activity.
2.6.4.6. Audit Privilege Use
This category configures auditing of each instance of a user exercising a user
right. Examples of this are a user exercising the shutdown system privilege to shut down
or reboot a machine, or the take ownership privilege of a file or directory. These events
can be informative about the occurrences of malicious activity but can generate a very
large number of event records.
2.6.4.7. Audit Process Tracking
This category configures auditing of detailed tracking information for events such
as program activation, process exit, handle duplication, and indirect object access. If the
organization security policy lists authorized processes executable by users and
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administrators within the organization it can identify unauthorized programs running such
as a Trojan horse, a rootkit, or other type of malicious software. It can also be beneficial
during an incident response by providing a detailed log of the processes started and the
time when they were started [21].
2.6.4.8. Audit System Events
This category audits system events such as starting or shutting down computers,
event logs filling up, the audit logs being cleared, or other security-related events that
affect the entire system. These events may help determine instances of unauthorized
system access, or critical circumstances that affect system security. For example, clearing
the audit logs would log an event 517, which would indicate that the audit log was
cleared. This could be an indication of a malicious user covering his/her tracks.
2.6.5. Security Templates
By default, Windows XP® is designed with user ability in mind and has limited
security enabled. Even fully patched with Service Pack 2 and all security updates,
Microsoft does not recommend the use of Windows XP® out-of-the-box default security
configuration on most enterprise networks [21]. There are many security settings that can
be configured, and Microsoft has suggested settings for an enterprise network. In order to
ensure that enterprise network security policies are applied to enterprise workstations,
security policies on individual workstations can be deployed with the use of security
templates. Security templates are text based files that contain values for security related
system settings, and make configuring those settings easier to manage and implement.
Administrators can create and update them using the Security Templates Microsoft
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Management Console (MMC) snap-in. These templates can be applied to a local
computer as an individual file, or to an entire group using Active Directory.
To configure a Windows XP® workstation for enterprise client network use,
Microsoft suggests starting with their enterprise client security template and configure it
for the organizations needs [21]. There are other recommended security templates
available such as those recommended by the National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) and the National Security Administration (NSA).
These security templates are designed for desktop workstations on an enterprise
network. Among these are the NIST Enterprise Client Desktop (NIST EC), NIST
Specialized Security Limited Functionality Desktop (NIST SSLF), and NSA Systems and
Network Attack Center Enterprise Client Desktop (NSA SNAC). Table 2.5 contains a
comparison between the audit settings of these configurations.
2.6.5.1. NIST EC, NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC EC Security Templates
The NIST as well as the NSA have worked together with the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), SysAdmin Audit
Network Security Institute (SANS), Center for Internet Security (CIS) and other vendors
to develop a set of benchmark security guides to provide a basic security template of
security settings for use in various environments [31]. NIST has developed several
security templates for Windows XP® that are recommended for use within enterprise
networks. For typical enterprise network use they recommend using the Enterprise Client
security template. The enterprise environment, also known as managed environment,
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typically consists of large organizational systems with defined suites of hardware and
software configurations. They usually consist of centrally managed workstations and
servers protected from threats on the internet with firewalls and other network security
devices [30]. For systems with a higher risk profile or risk exposure, NIST recommends
the Specialized Security-Limited Functionality (SSLF) security template. These include
systems that contain confidential information (i.e. personnel records, medical records,
and financial information) or perform vital organizational functions (i.e. accounting,
payroll processing, air traffic control) [30]. These systems are more likely to be attacked
Table 2.5: Audit Settings of Security Templates[21, 30, 31]
Windows
XP® Out of
the Box

NIST EC
Template

No Auditing

Success

No Auditing

Success

No Auditing

No
Auditing

No Auditing

Audit logon events

No Auditing

Success

Success,
Failure

NSA
SNAC
Template
Success,
Failure
Success,
Failure
No
Auditing
Success,
Failure

Audit object access

No Auditing

No
Auditing

Failure

Failure

Audit policy change

No Auditing

Success

Success

Success,
Failure

Audit privilege use

No Auditing

Failure

Failure

Audit process tracking

No Auditing

Audit system events

No Auditing

Audit Setting
Audit account logon
events
Audit account
management
Audit directory service
access
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No
Auditing
No
Auditing
Success

NIST SSLF
Template
Success,
Failure
Success,
Failure

No Auditing
Success

No
Auditing
Success,
Failure

by either outside or inside malicious parties. The auditing security settings in the NIST
SSLF security template are considerably more intensive than in NIST EC, and much more
information can be obtained from the audit logs. The drawback is that there is much more
information logged, resulting in a lot of information to sort through in order to find useful
information about an incident. The NSA SNAC Security Template is similar to the NIST
SSLF, but has some minor differences in the auditing configuration. Table 2.5 shows the
differences between the auditing settings of the security templates. In this thesis, the
auditing capabilities of these security templates will be tested and compared with a
customized auditing template created by the presented methodology.
2.7. Summary
This chapter has described the objectives for maintaining information security
within an enterprise network. It has also covered trends, characteristics, and types of
insider threats. Attack methods and ways of identifying insider threats were also
presented. Next, auditing was covered with a discussion on the definition of auditing, the
audit policy in an organization, and the role of auditing in the enterprise. Finally the types
of auditing, the categories of auditing, and the use of security templates were discussed.
3.
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4. III. Methodology
3.1. Chapter Overview
This chapter outlines the methodology used for developing a customized auditing
template for a computer workstation, the calculations and metrics used in this process,
and a method for evaluating the end product. It begins with a presentation of the research
goals and the approach taken to achieve these goals. Following sections define the system
under test, the component under test, and the experimental design. Next the system setup
and data collection are presented. Finally, the evaluation technique, calculations
performed, and metrics used are described.
3.2. Problem Definition
In addition to perimeter defenses, organizations often take advantage of available
resources to ensure security within the organization, such as the existing auditing
capabilities of Windows XP®. Often this is done blindly using existing security templates
recommended for use by NIST and NSA, without research into the auditing configurations
these templates contain, and how they meet their organizations requirements for
computer security. Rather than rely on existing client workstation auditing
configurations, an organization should know exactly what events its client workstations
are auditing, and configure the clients to audit based on computer security requirements
of the organization [29]. Currently there exists no defined methodology for creating a
customized auditing template based on organizational security requirements.
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3.2.1. Research Goals
The primary goal of this research is the establishment of a methodology for
developing a customized auditing template for a computer workstation to audit for insider
threats. It develops an insider threat client workstation-auditing model to create a tailored
auditing template for a Windows XP® workstation based on organizational computer
security requirements. This model uses the existing auditing capabilities of Windows
XP® and fine-tunes them to audit malicious insider activities.
3.2.2. Approach
An evaluation of the auditing categories available for configuration in Windows
XP® is performed to determine which configuration best detects the selected simulated
malicious insider scenarios. The categories available for configuration within Windows
XP® will each be enabled individually, one at a time, while all others are disabled to
evaluate the events logged for a particular category. There are currently nine auditing
categories in Windows XP®. A series of 18 malicious insider scenarios, as well as nonmalicious scenarios consisting of simulated typical user behaviors, are simulated and the
logs resulting from these activities are analyzed. There are 18 scenarios simulated, and 15
minutes of activities representative of normal user activity. The two questions to be
answered are:
1. Was the malicious activity detected in the logs with the current
category enabled? This would indicate that the particular category is
either useful or not for detecting that type of activity.
2. What is the particular cost involved in this identification? In other
words, what is the ratio of the events that identify the malicious activity
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to the number of other events in the logs? This will indicate the ease of
identifying the malicious activity.
These two questions are answered for each particular category of auditing within
Windows XP®. All categories are then compared, and selected or deselected for auditing
based on the criteria presented later in this chapter. The end result is a customized
auditing template based on the malicious scenarios selected. Finally, an evaluation of the
auditing template can be made based upon other preexisting auditing configurations
inside one-size-fits-all security templates (e.g. NIST EC, NIST SSLF, NSA SNAC, etc.)
3.3. System Boundaries
The system boundaries consist of the System Under Test (SUT), the Component
Under Study (CUS), the type of data input into them, and the processing of the output
from them.
3.3.1. Auditing System
The System Under Test (SUT) is the Windows XP® auditing system running
inside a virtual computer, using VmWare Workstation (Figure 3.1). It is a basic
installation of Windows XP® Professional with Service Pack 2 and all Microsoft security
patches as of February 28, 2006. The SUT includes an adjustable auditing configuration,
which is the Component Under Study (CUS). The parameters are the nine auditing
categories, configured one at a time to audit success and failure, while all other categories
record nothing. The input for the SUT is the group of 18 simulated malicious scenarios,
and the non-malicious (normal user) scenarios. All scenarios are manually executed
through the SUT, independently one at a time while the CUS audits for success and
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failure. The Windows XP® system audits accordingly and records detectable events in a
security log. After each test run is complete, the virtual machine is reset to the baseline
configuration. This is accomplished using a VmWare snapshot.
The scope of the experiment is limited to a single workstation operating in
VmWare without network connectivity. It is designed to simulate the security
implications of multiple users sharing a common workstation. The workstation does not
include the logging of network access and interaction with other workstations, servers, or
peripheral devices.

System Under Test
Malicious and
Non-Malicious
Insider
Behavior
Scenarios

Input

Output
CUS

VmWare Running
WinXP
Professional

Auditing
Configuration

Parameters:
Configuration of the Nine Auditing Categories one at
at time to be set to audit success and audit failure.

Saved Event
logs (as .evt
and .csv files)

EventcombMT
Filters insider
threat events

Access DB

Evaluation and Answer
To Questions 1 and 2

Figure 3.10: Windows XP® Auditing System
3.4. Parameters
The system parameters are the audit category settings. Currently there are nine
audit categories for the Windows XP® workstation. Each category has four configuration
settings, (1) no auditing, (2) audit success, (3) audit failure, or (4) both audit success and
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failure. To represent these, each of the nine categories is represented by 2 switches, one
for success audit, and one for failure audit. This represents each of the four
configurations; (1) Neither success switch nor failure switch is enabled = no audit, (2)
success switch is on, failure switch is off = success audit, (3) success switch is off, failure
switch is on = failure audit, and (4) both success and failure switches are on = both
success and failure audit. Table 3.1 shows these switches and their corresponding audit
categories. The resulting logs are parsed into success and failure audits for further
evaluation and analysis.
Table 3.1: Switches and Corresponding Categories and Settings
Switch
S1
F1
S2
F2
S3
F3
S4
F4
S5
F5
S6
F6
S7
F7
S8
F8
S9
F9

Corresponding Category and Setting
Success Audit Account Logon Events
Failure Audit Account Logon Events
Success Audit Account Management
Failure Audit Account Management
Success Audit Directory Service Access
Failure Audit Directory Service Access
Success Audit Logon Events
Failure Audit Logon Events
Success Audit Object Access
Failure Audit Object Access
Success Audit Policy Change
Failure Audit Policy Change
Success Audit Privilege Use
Failure Audit Privilege Use
Success Audit Process Tracking
Failure Audit Process Tracking
Success Audit System Events
Failure Audit System Events

3.5. Data Collection
The output from the SUT for each scenario is parsed into success and failure
fields in a Microsoft Excel® worksheet, and then grouped by category. EventcombMT, a
free utility available from Microsoft, is used to parse the logs to find known logged
41

events that correspond to the malicious actions performed. EventcombMT is configured
with a list of common events which are indicative of malicious insider activities. The
EventcombMT output is saved to a Microsoft® Access Database for further analysis to
identify simulated malicious insider actions.
3.6. System Setup
The virtual machine consists of VmWare, version 5.0.0, build 13124. The
hardware platform consists of a Toshiba laptop with a Pentium IV 3.06 GHz Processor,
and 896 MB of Random Access Memory. The Virtual Operating System is Windows
XP® Professional. The operating system is patched with Service Pack 2 and all available
security patches from the Microsoft Update website as of 28 February 2006.
3.7. Procedure
Each time a group of scenarios is simulated, the following steps are completed to
ensure that the samples obtained are completely individual and specific to the current
switch setting:
1. Load VMWare snapshot – This resets the virtual machine to the baseline for each
group of scenarios to run within a specific audit category.
2. Configure Category – The particular audit category under test is configured to
enable both success and failure auditing. All others are set to no auditing.
3. Wipe audit logs – All logs (application, security, and system) are cleared to
ensure that there are not any other logged events in them.
4. Perform test run – The 18 malicious scenarios, as well as the non-malicious
scenarios (simulated normal user activity) are manually executed using a
checklist of exactly what is to be performed.
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5. Save log files – Upon completion of the test run, all audit logs (application,
security, and system) are saved as .evt and .csv files for later analysis offline.
6. Evaluate log files – Upon completion of all scenarios for a particular audit
category, the security audit logs are evaluated to determine if they logged the
identifying events, and their events are separated by scenario for further analysis.
3.8. Experimental Design
The experimental design for this research is a factorial design with one factor, the
auditing settings [37]. The source of randomness in this experiment was the scenarios.
The number of experiments performed:
•

Number of scenarios = 18

•

Number of auditing settings = 9 categories * 4 settings each = 36

Total number of experiments (18) * (36) = 648
3.9. Malicious Scenarios
A critical factor in the methodology is the selection of malicious scenarios. An
organization needs to select these scenarios carefully to ensure they represent their
identified insider threat security requirements. For this experiment, the scenarios are
selected based upon possible requirements of a typical organization. For this experiment
eighteen scenarios are selected as an example of possible scenarios an organization might
select. The scenarios focus on protecting the confidentiality of files on a shared
workstation. The scenarios simulate multiple users using a common workstation, and a
malicious user attempting to access other users files. The scenarios simulate various
techniques that a malicious insider might use to obtain access to vital information.
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Privileges held by administrators as well as normal users are represented in the scenarios.
The scenarios are presented in Appendix A and described step by step in Appendix B.
3.10.

Non-malicious Scenarios (Simulated Normal User Activity)
In order to gain an understanding of the size and typical number of entries

captured in a workstation audit log, some non-malicious, normal user, activities are
simulated. This consists of typical activities that normal users do in day-to-day use of a
workstation. A selection of 15 minutes worth of typical normal activities such as word
processing, spreadsheet creation, and internet browsing were used in the experiment. A
list of these activities can be found in Appendix C. The events logged are then
extrapolated to get one weeks worth of normal user activity. To simulate this, the 15
minutes of normal user activity is multiplied by 160. This one-week worth of normal user
activity is called the Calculated Normal User Count (CNUC). It is used in calculations to
help determine the best auditing configuration for logging the malicious scenarios. One
week of normal user activity is chosen as an example, and an assumption is made that a
security administrator can check a particular workstation once a week for malicious
activity and would therefore sort through one week’s worth of normal user activity. In a
real case situation, an organization would know its security administration procedures
and select a period of time more realistic to their organization based on their security
procedures.
The non-malicious activity is not intended to be directly representative of typical
normal user activity, but only to serve as a controlled, consistent method of generating
typical user activities in no specific order. This strategy helps introduce deterministic
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activity with malicious activity to the SUT. Another approach is for an organization using
this model to generate an average event count from actual logs on various workstations
within the organization, which would be a more accurate representation of normal user
behavior.
3.11.

Evaluation Technique
Once the results from the malicious scenarios are collected and evaluated, they

are put into a table for ease of analysis to determine the best selection of switches for an
organization based on their security requirements, an example is shown in Table 3.3. In
this example, the scenario detections are in bold. This table, along with the calculations
presented in the section 3.10.1, and the selection criteria presented in section 3.10.2 will
enable an organization to select the best categories to select for auditing in their audit
configuration.
Table 3.3: Breakdown of Events and Detections
Scenarios
1a
2a
3a
4a
5a
6a
7a
8a
9a
10a
11u
12u
13u
14a
15a
16u
17u
18u
Total Events
Total Detects Per Switch

Categories (Switches)
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Scenario Detected
0 0
0
0
0
1 0 1 0
1 0
1
1 0
4 0
2
2
Yes
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 15
0
0 0
0 0
2
0
0
0
Yes
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 62
0
0 0
0 0
2
0
0
0
Yes
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0
0 108
0 0
0 0
0
0
0
0
Yes
1 7 2 0
0 0
6 6 86
0
0 0
1 0 35
0
0
0
Yes
3 7 6 0
0 0 11 7 21
0
0 0 11 0 88
0
0
0
Yes
2 8 1 0
0 0
7 8 33
0
0 0 10 0 47
0
0
0
Yes
0 1 1 0
0 0
9 2 17
0
0 0 10 0 46
0
0
0
Yes
3 2 0 0
0 0
2 1
0
0 0
5 0 12
0
0
0
6
Yes
0 1 0 0
0 0
2 0
0
0 0
0 0 12
0
0
0
Yes
1
1 0 0 0
0 0
2 1
0
0
0 0
1 0 10
0
0
0
No
0 0 0 0
0 0
0 0 54
0
0 0
0 0
3
0
0
0
Yes
0 0 0 0
0 0
2 0
0 108
0 0
0 0
9
0
0
0
Yes
0 1 0 0
0 0
4 1 76 78
0 0 13 0 22
0
0
0
Yes
0 0
0
0
0
2 1 1 0
3 1
5
1 0
6 0 13
1
Yes
0 0
3
1 0 39 0 40
0 28
0
Yes
1 4 0 0
9 4 12
2 0 0 0
0 0 35 0 73
0 12 0 22 0 36
7 16
0
Yes
1 1 0 0
0 0
2 1
0
0 11 0
8 0 30
0
0
0
Yes
0 0 95 32 461 298 26 0 130 0 409
7 47
0
17 33 12 0
3

0

6

0

0

0

3

0

7
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3

2

0

2

0

3

0

3

0

3.11.1. Auditing Template Creation Methods
There are two methods used for creating a custom auditing template, the Switch
Evaluation Method (SEM), and the Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM). Each
serves a different purpose, and it is suggested that an organization try both methods to
determine which works best for their security requirements.
3.11.2. Switch Evaluation Method
The SEM uses calculations, metrics, and organization established criteria to assist
in creating a Windows XP® auditing template based on a per switch evaluation. It uses
metrics for evaluating the quality of a given switch at detecting the malicious act, as well
as the cost involved in that detection. The development of metrics allows the comparison
of the switches to determine the best combination to put into the Windows XP®
workstation auditing template. In this method, seven metrics were created for measuring
the effectiveness of a given auditing category given that a set of malicious scenarios is
encountered. The metrics used for this method are:
1. Switch Detection Coverage (SDC)
2. Calculated Normal User Count (CNUC)
3. Switch Activity Cost (SAC)
4. Total Activity Cost (TAC)
5. Switch False Positive Count (SFPC)
6. Switch Figure of Merit, (SFOM)
Switch Detection Coverage (SDC), is the metric that identifies how well a given
switch performs at detecting a given set of scenarios. Calculated Normal User Count
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(CNUC), is a calculated amount of simulated weekly normal user activities. Switch
Activity Cost (SAC), is the total number of logged events for a given switch after running
the malicious scenarios, the non-malicious scenario, and calculating the CNUC. Total
Activity Cost (TAC), is the total of all switch SAC’s. Switch False Positive Count
(SFPC), is the total number of false positives of a switch after running the malicious
scenarios and calculating the CNUC. After the previous metrics have been derived, the
Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM), is created by constructing a weighted function of these
metrics. The SFOM metric will allow for an objective comparison of performance
between the individual switches. The weights assigned in the function are selected to
scale the importance of each of the constituent metrics according to organizational
security requirements. In addition, formulation of the problem in this form enables the
optimal selection of auditing categories by using existing linear optimization
methodologies.
In order to represent each of the metrics and the switch figure of merit, the
problem is loosely framed in the context of set theory [38]:
Auditing configuration is determined by setting or clearing a set of 18 auditing
switches, both success switches and failure switches (. Each auditing switch takes on one
of two discrete values, either on or off:
Value = {0,1}

(Eq. 3.1)

A Switch, Sx where x = [1..M], is assigned an element of the set Value:
Sx = Value
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(Eq. 3.2)

An auditing configuration, AC, consists of a set of M Switches. When an auditing
configuration is evaluated in it’s entirety based on its current set of M switches, it is
referred to as ACX:
ACx = {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M }

(Eq. 3.3)

The scenarios, SC, consist of a malicious scenario set, SCM, a non-malicious
scenario set, SCN. The malicious scenario set, SCM, consists of the 18 selected simulated
malicious scenarios:

{

SCM = SCM1 , SCM 2 ,..., SCM18

}

(Eq. 3.4)

The non-malicious scenario set, SCN, consists of one 15 minute scenario
consisting of simulated typical normal user activity:

{

SC N = SCN1

}

(Eq. 3.5)

The events are the events that appear in the security audit log after the scenarios
are executed. They consist of the events from the malicious scenarios, EM , and the events
from the non-malicious scenarios, EN. The total events for a given switch, Sx, after all
malicious scenarios, EM , and non-malicious scenarios, EN, have been executed are Ex
where ( x | x ∈ {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M } ) . The set of all possible events is the total of all events for
all switches, ET, as ET = ∪ Ex where ( x | x ∈ {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M } ) .
In the following sections, we loosely use set theory notation to define metrics that
represent the effectiveness of a given Switch, S, and a given overall AuditConfiguration,

AC, when subjected to a given set of scenarios, SCM and SCN.
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3.11.2.1. Switch Detection Coverage
One of the most important metrics in evaluating a switches merit is how well it is
at detecting a set of scenarios. For this reason, the first metric introduced is the Switch
Detection Coverage (SDC). A given malicious scenario is deemed to be detected if the
critical event appears in the security log file. The SDC is a measure of how well an
individual audit switch did at finding the set of malicious scenarios, SCM. The set of
malicious scenarios detected, SCD, where SCD ⊆ SCM . It is calculated as the number of
detected scenarios, SCD, divided by the total number of malicious scenarios, SCM, in the
malicious scenario set for a given audit switch configuration.

SDC Sx =

| SCD |
| SCM |

(Eq. 3.6)

The SDC is an unbiased indicator at how well a particular audit switch, Sx, is at
detecting the malicious behavior contained in a given malicious scenario set, SCM.
For example, suppose an organization, in using the insider threat client
workstation-auditing model to create their auditing configuration, has created a set of 15
malicious scenarios in order to determine the effectiveness of the current audit switches.
They would run each of the scenarios contained in the scenario set for each switch and
determine which of the scenarios are detected. If 10 of the 15 total scenarios are detected
for a given switch, the SDC calculation for that switch would be:
SDC

S

x

=

| SCD | 10
= = 0.667
| SCM | 15

49

(Eq. 3.7)

While SDC is an effective measure of the detection coverage of a given audit
switch under a given set of scenarios, it fails to account for the cost in log file size and
false positives encountered.
3.11.2.2. Activity Costs

Activity Costs (AC) are considered an obstruction to identifying the events that
indicate the malicious act. They are events captured that are not indicative of a malicious
act. AC’s conceal and obfuscate the events necessary to identify a malicious act. They can
be thought of as “background noise”. They appear in every malicious and non-malicious
scenario and must be filtered out to find the events that indicate a malicious act has
occurred.
False Positive Events (FPE) have a greater cost than activity costs because they
are misleading. FPE’s often make the security administrator think that they indicate a
malicious act when in fact there is no malicious activity. The extra time it takes for a
security administrator to evaluate and determine the legitimacy of an FPE can be very
costly.
3.11.2.3. Calculated Normal User Count

The auditing switches differ from one another in terms of the events, EX, they
generate in the security log files. Each event in the log file is an indicator of a specific
event occurring and incurs a cost in terms of disk storage. To add realism to the model,
non-malicious normal user activities are simulated to add to the size and complexity of
the security logs. Non-malicious normal user events are the events that are logged
continuously, and must be sorted through to find malicious activities. For this study, non50

malicious normal user events, EN, are calculated for the period of a week, to simulate the
log size of a workstation that is examined weekly. To calculate the Calculated Normal
User Count, CNUC, the 15 minute non-malicious scenario events, EN, is multiplied times
160 to represent a week.
CNUC

Sx

= 160 x | EN |

(Eq. 3.8)

For example, suppose an organization is using the insider threat client
workstation-auditing model and has created a set of 15 non-malicious scenarios contained
in SCN in order to determine the effectiveness of a particular audit switch. If they want to
determine the CNUC obtained using the current audit switch, Sx, they would run the nonmalicious scenario set for 15 minutes, sum the number of normal user events that were
added to the security log, multiply by 160 to get a weekly count. If they had 17 normal
user events added to the security log in 15 minutes, the calculation would be:
CNUC

Sx

= 160 x 17 = 2720

(Eq. 3.9)

3.11.2.4. Switch Activity Cost

As noted earlier, each event, or line in a log file, incurs a cost in terms of disk
storage and obfuscation. For this reason, activity cost for each switch must be
determined. The Switch Activity Cost (SAC), is a measure of how many lines are
generated in the security log files resulting from a given auditing switch, Sx, both from
the malicious scenarios and from the Calculated Normal User Cost (CNUC). It is
calculated by taking the sum of the malicious scenarios events, EM, and the CNUC (which
is EN times 160):

SAC S =| EM | + CNUC | S x
x
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(Eq. 3.10)

For example, suppose an organization has created a set of 15 malicious scenarios
contained in SCM, and 15 minutes of non-malicious normal user activity contained in
SCN. If they want to determine the SAC, of a particular audit switch, SX, they could test
each of the scenarios contained in the scenario set and the 15 minutes of normal user
activity and compute the CNUC for the switch. They then add the malicious scenario
events, EM, to the CNUC. If EM is 500 events, and the CNUC was 2720, the calculation
would be:
SAC S = ( 500 + 2720 ) = 3220

(Eq. 3.11)

x

While SAC is an effective measure of the cost in log file lines associated with a
given audit switch under a given set of malicious and non-malicious scenarios, it fails to
account for the false positives encountered.
3.11.2.5. Total Activity Cost

The Total Activity Cost, TAC, is the total number of activity costs for all
switches, ST, including malicious scenarios, SCM, and the CNUC (calculated from the
non-malicious scenarios SCN). It is the set of all possible events, or the total of all events
for all switches, ET, as ET = ∪ Ex where ( x | x = {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M } ) . It is calculated as the
sum of the SAC’s for all switches, or the union of all switch total events, EX:
TAC S = ∪ Ex

(Eq. 3.12)

T

For example, suppose a given organization has created a set of 15 malicious
scenarios contained in SCM, and calculated its CNU from the non-malicious scenario,
SCN, and the SAC results are as follows:
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Switch S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
SAC
1320 543 36 1003 920 45 890 63 0 943 54 5 0 0 31 133 920 0

The calculation would be:

TAC

SX

⎛1320 + 543 + 36 + 1003 + 920 ⎞
⎜
⎟
= ⎜ +45 + 890 + 63 + 0 + 943 + 54 ⎟ = 6906
⎜ +5 + 0 + 0 + 31 + 133 + 920 + 0 ⎟
⎝
⎠

(Eq. 3.13)

3.11.2.6. Switch False Positive Count

Since the detection of a specific scenario is dependant on the detection of a single
critical event and not a specific chain of events, it is possible that we may believe that we
have detected malicious behavior when in reality the critical event resulted from a
legitimate system action. For this reason, the next metric introduced is the Switch False
Positive Count (SFPC). The SFPC is a measure of how many critical events occurred
that did not correspond to a malicious scenario given an audit switch, Sx , the set of
malicious scenarios, SCM, and the set of non-malicious scenarios, SCN. It is calculated as
the sum of critical events not detecting a malicious scenario that occurred in the log file
resulting from the set of malicious scenarios, and the CNUC. It is simply a count of
events that have the same event numbers as detection but are not detections in the SAC.
This is not easily defineable by set theory:
For example, suppose a given organization created a set of 15 malicious scenarios
contained in SCM, in the current audit switch, Sx, and there were 3 False Positive Events,
and they also executed a set of 15 minutes of non-malicious scenarios contained in SCN,
and calculated the CNUC which produced 32 False Positives. The SFPC would be:
SFPC S = 3 + 32 = 35
x
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(Eq. 3.14)

3.11.2.7. Switch Figure of Merit

The Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) is a weighted metric that applies a value to
each switch based on its performance given the selected scenarios. It allows the switches
to be objectively compared against each other. To calculate the SFOM, the calculations
from the following metrics that have been calculated are used. They include the
following:
1. Switch Detection Coverage (SDC)
2. Calculated Normal User Count (CNUC)
3. Switch Activity Costs (SAC)
4. Total Activity Costs (TAC)
5. Switch False Positive Count (SFPC)
Each of the metrics identified above provide valuable information about the
quality of an audit switch, Sx, given a set of malicious scenarios, SCM, and a
corresponding set of non-malicious scenarios, SCN. However, it is desirable to create a
single figure of merit that allows for quick and easy comparison of audit categories to
allow the optimal selection of an auditing template. For this reason, the Switch Figure of
Merit (SFOM) metric is introduced, combining the Switch Detection Coverage (SDC),
the Switch Activity Costs (SAC), the Total Activity Costs (TAC), and the Switch False
Positive Count (SFPC) into a single, derived metric:
S FOM

Sx

⎡ SAC ⎤
⎡ SFPC ⎤
= W 1 x SDC |S x − W 2 x ⎢
|S x − W 3 x ⎢
|S
⎥
⎣ TAC ⎦
⎣ SAC ⎥⎦ x

(Eq. 3.15)

No similar metric could be found for this type of application, so this metric was
contrived specifically for this methodology. The metric takes into consideration, the 3
most important components of an audit category; the detections, the activity costs, and
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the false positives. There exists a balance between these three components. The positive
component (detections) is offset by the negative components (activity costs and false
positives). If a large number of detections are desired, and auditing switches are selected
accordingly to audit more events, then the negative affect is an increase in activity costs
and false positives. On the other hand, if selecting audit switches is based on attempting
to lower activity costs or false positives, then the total detections will be lowered. This
metric takes these factors into consideration and provides the capability to assign a
weight to each of the components of the metric based upon their importance to the
organizational mission. In parallel to Statistical Decision Theory, in which statistics are
integrated with decision-making, the selection of weights based upon organizational
priorities assists in the organization’s creation of an auditing template by enabling a
tailored organizational balance between high detection rates, log file size, and false
alarms [39]. The higher each weight, the more importance it is considered to hold, and
the lower each weight, the less importance. Weight 1, W 1 , is applied to detection
coverage, Weight 2, W 2 , is applied to activity cost, and Weight 3, W 3 , is applied to false
positives. If the organization is more concerned with having a higher detection coverage
and realizes that in order to have this it must tolerate a higher activity cost and a higher
false positive count, then it can give a higher weighted value to W 1 and a lower weighted
value to W 2 and W 3 . For example an organization in which auditing is so critical that
missing a detection could cause death or serious economic loss, such as a nuclear facility
or a financial institution, would probably put more weight on W 1 and less weight on W 2
and W 3 . If the organization is more concerned with having a lower total cost and
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number of false alarms, perhaps because it has limited resources for robust auditing, and
realizes that it will get less detections as a result, then it will put a lower weight on W 1
and a higher weight on W 2 and W 3 .
For example, suppose a given organization created a set of 15 malicious scenarios
contained in SCM, in a current audit switch, Sx, and they also executed a set of 15 minutes
of non-malicious scenarios contained in SCN, and calculated their CNUC. After doing
their calculations using the given metrics, they had a CDC of 0.667, a CAC of 3220, a
TAC of 6906, and a CFPC of 34. If they decide that detections are very important to

them, and costs and false positives are less important and they give W 1 a weight of 10,
W 2 a weight of 2, and W 3 a weight of 2. The Switch Figure of Merit, SFOM, for that

particular switch would be:
SFOM

Sx

⎡ 3220 ⎤
⎡ 34 ⎤
= 10 x (.667) − 2 ⎢
−2⎢
= 5.6216
⎥
⎣ 6906 ⎦
⎣ 587 ⎥⎦

(Eq. 3.16)

The organization would calculate this SFOM for all switches, and then use the
results to assist in selecting the switches for their auditing template based on the switches
with the highest SFOM’s.
If the organization decided that detections are less important, and lower costs and
false positives is more important and they give W 1 a weight of 2, W 2 a weight of 10, and
W 3 a weight of 10. The Switch Figure of Merit, SFOM, would be:

SFOM

Sx

⎡ 3220 ⎤
⎡ 34 ⎤
= 2 x (.667) − 10 ⎢
− 10 ⎢
= −3.9078
⎥
⎣ 6906 ⎦
⎣ 587 ⎥⎦

(Eq. 3.17)

Since in this example the higher weights were given to W 2 and W 3 , which are
subtracted from W 1 , it is possible for the CFOM to be a negative number. In this case the
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organization would compare all switches SFOM’s, and the switches with the least
negative number (higher of the two) would be more beneficial to the organization.
It is important to point out that when the organization chooses their weights for
W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 , they will need to be applied to all switches equally. If the organization

chooses to change those weights, they must change them for all switches.
3.11.2.8. Switch Selection Criteria

Now that all results have been evaluated and calculations made, the organization
can select the switches for its auditing template. An organization can select criteria to use
based on its security requirements to select audit switches for its auditing template using
the calculated SFOM’s as needed for decision making. These are the organizations
Switch Selection Criteria (SSC). During this experiment, based on the simulated
organizational security assumptions made earlier, the switches for the auditing template
were selected based on the following criteria:
1. The switches are selected so that all scenarios are detected, regardless of
the SFOM value.
2. If more than one switch detects the same scenarios, select the switch for
auditing with the highest SFOM value, and do not select the others.
3. If a switch did not detect any scenario, then do not select it for auditing.
These criteria were used in conjunction with the results and calculations to create
an auditing template. The results and the auditing template selected for this experiment
are discussed in chapter 4.
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3.11.3. Configuration Evaluation Method

The Audit Selection Criteria mentioned above, using the SFOM appears to be
sufficient at identifying the best switches to enable for an auditing template, but can be
considered naïve because it evaluates switches individually based upon their own merit,
but doesn’t compare sets of them together [3]. Another way of identifying the best
configuration to identify a given set of malicious activities is to evaluate each possible
audit configuration in its entirety. This is done using the Configuration Evaluation
Method (CEM). This method examines all possible audit configurations available, which
for the 18 switches is 218 , or 262,144 possible configurations. It would be impossible to
do this manually, but it can be done exhaustively using software. A software program
developed using C++ for this experiment exhaustively takes each individual audit
configuration available, calculates a Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) metric, and
presents the best auditing configuration for detecting the given scenarios based on the
switches with the highest CFOM value. Additionally, it calculates and indicates the
CFOM for 3 available auditing configurations in existing security templates; NIST EC,
NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC EC. Sample output from this program can be seen in

Appendix E, and it’s written code can be seen in Appendix F.
3.11.3.1. Configuration Figure of Merit

Just like the SFOM, the Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) is a weighted
metric used for objective comparison. It is used to compare multiple audit configurations.
It applies a value to each configuration based on its performance given the selected
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scenarios. It allows the configurations to be objectively compared against each other. To
calculate the CFOM, the calculations from the following metrics are used:
1. Configuration Detection Coverage (CDC)
2. Configuration Activity Cost (CAC)
3. Configuration Total Activity Cost (CTAC)
4. Configuration False Positive Count (CFPC)
Just as with the Switch Evaluation Method (SEM), in order to represent each of
the metrics and the switch figure of merit, the problem is loosely framed in the context of
set theory [38]:
Auditing configuration is determined by setting or clearing a set of 18 auditing
switches. Each auditing switch takes on one of two discrete values, either on or off:
Value = {0,1}

(Eq. 3.18)

A Switch, Sx where x = [1..M], is assigned an element of the set Value:
(Eq. 3.19)

Sx = Value

An auditing configuration, AC, consists of a set of M Switches. When an auditing
configuration is evaluated in it’s entirety based on its current set of M switches, it is
referred to as ACX:
ACx = {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M }

(Eq. 3.20)

The scenarios, SC, consist of a malicious scenario set, SCM, a non-malicious
scenario set, SCN. The malicious scenario set, SCM, consists of the 18 selected simulated
malicious scenarios:

{

SCM = SCM1 , SCM 2 ,..., SCM18
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}

(Eq. 3.21)

The non-malicious scenario set, SCN, consists of one 15 minute scenario
consisting of simulated typical normal user activity:

{

SC N = SCN1

}

(Eq. 3.22)

The events are the events that appear in the security audit log for a after the
scenarios are executed. They consist of the events from the malicious scenarios, EM , and
the events from the non-malicious scenarios, EN. The total events for a given switch, Sx,
after all malicious scenarios, EM , and non-malicious scenarios, EN, have been executed
are EX where ( x | x ∈ {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M } ) . The set of all possible events is the total of all
events for all switches, ET, as ET = ∪ Ex where ( x | x ∈ {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M } ) .

3.11.3.2. Configuration Detection Coverage

The Configuration Detection Coverage (CDC) is a measure of how well a
complete auditing configuration performs at detecting a set of malicious scenarios, SCM.
It is calculated the same way that the SDC is calculated, with the exception that the
results are based on a given entire audit configuration, ACx, instead of a single audit
switch, SX. The set of malicious scenarios detected, SCD, where SCD ⊆ SCM . It is
calculated as the sum of detected scenarios, SCD, divided by the total number of
malicious scenarios, SCM, in the malicious scenario set for a given audit configuration,
ACx = ∪ ACT (T | T ∈ {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M } ) .
CDC AC =
x
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| SCD |
| SCM |

(Eq. 3.23)

The CDC is an unbiased indicator as to how well a particular Audit
Configuration, ACx, is at detecting the malicious behaviors contained in a given malicious
scenario set, SCM. For example, suppose an organization has created a set of 15 malicious
scenarios in order to determine the effectiveness of its audit configuration. They would
run each of the scenarios contained in the malicious scenario set, SCM, and determine
which of the scenarios in the set are detected. If 13 of the 15 total scenarios are detected,
the calculation would be:
CDC AC =
x

| SCD | 13
= = 0.867
| SCM | 15

(Eq. 3.24)

While CDC is an effective measure of the detection coverage for a given audit
configuration under a given set of scenarios, it fails to account for the cost in log file size
and false positives encountered.
3.11.3.3. Configuration Activity Cost

As noted earlier, each event, or line in a log file, incurs a cost in terms of disk
space and needs to be considered for the entire audit configuration. Configuration
Activity Cost (CAC) is the total activity cost for the current audit configuration, which is
the sum of all events in the security log for that configuration after the malicious
scenarios have been executed and the switch CNUC is calculated. It is calculated as the
sum of the SAC’s for each current audit switch enabled for auditing:

ACx = ∪ ACs

( s | s ∈ {S , S ,..., S }) .
1

2

M

CAC AC =| EM | + CNUC | ACx
x
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(Eq. 3.25)

For example, suppose an organization has created and executed its set of 15 malicious
scenarios contained in SCM, and calculated enabled all enabled switches CNUC’s in
order to determine the effectiveness of its audit configuration. They currently have 7
audit switches enabled for auditing (S2, S3, S4, S5, S7, F7, and S8) and their SACs are 322,
193, 278, 256, 3023, 165, and 54 respectively. The CAC calculation would be:
⎛ 322 + 193 + 278 + 256 ⎞
CAC AC = ⎜
⎟ = 4291
x
⎝ +3023 + 165 + 54
⎠

(Eq. 3.26)

3.11.3.4. Configuration Total Activity Cost

The Configuration Total Activity Cost (CTAC), is identical to the Total Activity
Cost, TAC, used in the SEM. It is the total number of activity costs for all switches, ST,
not just the ones enabled in the given audit configuration, ACX. It is the total of all
switches SAC’s. It is the set of all possible events, or the total of all events for all
switches, ET, as ET = ∪ Ex where ( x | x = {S1 , S 2 ,..., S M } ) . It is calculated as the sum of
the SAC’s for all switches, or the union of all switch total events, ET:
CTAC AC = ET = ∪ Ex

(Eq. 3.27)

x

For example, suppose an organization enabled all switches for auditing, created and
executed a set of 15 malicious scenarios contained in SCM, and calculated each switches
CNUC for SCN. All SAC’s are as follows:
Switch S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
SAC
1320 543 36 1003 920 45 890 63 0 943 54 5 0 0 31 133 920 0

The calculation would be:
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CTAC

AC x

⎛ 1320 + 543 + 36 + 1003 + 920 ⎞
⎜
⎟
= ⎜ + 45 + 890 + 63 + 0 + 943 + 54 ⎟ = 6906
⎜ + 5 + 0 + 0 + 31 + 133 + 920 + 0 ⎟
⎝
⎠

(Eq. 3.28)

3.11.3.5. Configuration False Positive Count

Just as with the SEM, the SFPC is a measure of how many critical events
occurred that did not correspond to a malicious scenario, only for the CEM it’s
determined for the given audit configuration, ACX. It is calculated as the sum of critical
events not detecting a malicious scenario that occurred in the log file resulting from the
set of malicious scenarios, and the CNUC. It is simply a count of events that have the
same event numbers as detection but are not detections in the SAC. This is not easily
defineable by set theory:
For example, suppose an organization evaluating their current audit configuration, ACX,
created a set of 15 malicious scenarios contained in SCM, calculated all CNUC’s for SCN,
have 6 audit switches enabled for auditing (S2, F2, S4, S5, S7, and S8), and their SFPCs are
2, 33, 212, 0, 510, and 0 respectively. The CFPC calculation would be:
CFPC AC = ( 2 + 33 + 212 + 0 + 510 + 0 ) = 757

(Eq. 3.29)

x

3.11.3.6. Configuration Figure of Merit

In order to evaluate an overall audit configuration’s ability to detect the given
scenarios so that the optimal auditing template can be determined, the above metrics are
combined into a single, derived metric:
CFOM

ACx

⎡ CAC ⎤
⎡ CFPC ⎤
= W 1 x CDC − W 2 x ⎢
|AC x − W 3 x ⎢
| AC x (Eq. 3.30)
⎥
⎣ CTAC ⎦
⎣ CAC ⎥⎦
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Just as with the SFOM discussed in section 3.11.2.7, the organization can place
values into the weights W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 based on its current security requirements. For
example, suppose an organization evaluating their current audit configuration, ACX,
created a set of 15 malicious scenarios contained in SCM, calculated all SNUC’s for nonmalicious scenarios in SCN, and have 8 audit switches enabled for auditing (S2, F2, S4, S5,
F5, S6, S7, and S8). After completing their calculations using the given metrics, they have
a CDC of .867, a CAC of 4291, a CTAC of 6906, and a CFPC of 757. If they decide that
detections are very important to them, and costs and false positives are less important and
they give W 1 a weight of 3, W 2 a weight of 1, and W 3 a weight of 1. The Configuration
Figure of Merit, CFOM, would be:
CFOM

AC x

⎡ 4291 ⎤
⎡ 757 ⎤
= 3 x (.867) − 1 ⎢
− 1⎢
= 1.803
⎥
⎣ 6906 ⎦
⎣ 4291 ⎥⎦

(Eq. 3.31)

If they decide that detections are less important, and lower costs and false
positives is more important and they give W 1 a weight of 1, W 2 a weight of 3, and W 3 a
weight of 2. The Configuration Figure of Merit, CFOM, would be:
CFOM

ACx

⎡ 4291 ⎤
⎡ 757 ⎤
= 1 x (.867) − 3 ⎢
− 2⎢
= −1.350
⎥
⎣ 6906 ⎦
⎣ 4291 ⎥⎦

(Eq. 3.32)

These two values of 1.803 and -1.350 have no relationship to each other, because
they are based on different weights. They would be used to compare against other
CFOM’s which have been calculated using their same weights. Comparisons can only be

made between configurations if the same weights are used for each configuration.
Based on the weights for W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 that an organization decides upon, the
software calculates the CFOM for all possible audit configurations, and then uses the
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results to select the 20 audit configurations with the highest CFOM’s. It also displays the
CFOM that would have resulted from the use of the audit configurations in 1 of 3 security

templates; NIST EC, NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC.
3.11.3.7. Existing Configuration Evaluation

The calculations used for the CEM can be used to evaluate a current auditing
template against an existing audit configuration in a security template (e.g. NIST EC,
SNAC, etc.), or to compare between two audit configurations. In this experiment,

Microsoft Excel® is used to input audit configuration data and calculate the resulting
CFOM. An example of this is performed in Chapter 4, and the spreadsheet can be seen in

Appendix 3.2.
3.12. Summary

The experimental design described in this chapter can be used to create a
customized insider threat auditing template for a Microsoft Windows XP®. It is used to
determine how well a Microsoft Windows XP® auditing system can detect particular
insider threats, using scenarios focused on unique organizational security requirements.
The approach, auditing system, and evaluation technique were covered. The results of the
experiment are presented in the next chapter.
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5. IV. Results
4.1. Chapter Overview

This chapter presents the results of the experimental methodology applied in
Chapter 3. First, the results of the Switch Evaluation Method (SEM) are analyzed using
the Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) to determine which switches achieve the best results
based on selected scenarios. Second, the results and the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC)
are used to select an auditing template. Using the Configuration Evaluation Method
(CEM) the auditing template is subsequently compared to audit configurations from the
following security templates:

(1) National Institute of Standards and Technology’s

(NIST) Enterprise Client Security Template (NIST EC), (2) NIST ‘s Specialized Security
Limited Functionality Security Template (NIST SSLF), and (3) National Security Agency
Systems and Network Attack Center’s Security Template (NSA SNAC) [30, 31]. Finally,
using the developed software, the CEM’s ability to create an auditing template is
demonstrated based on the same results of the malicious and non-malicious scenarios
used in the SEM.
4.2. Switch Evaluation Method Results

The Switch Evaluation Method (SEM) results are presented in this section. The
SEM gives the information owner the ability to create an auditing template using the

individual Switch Figures of Merit (SFOM), and the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC). All
results used to calculate the SFOM are presented, as well as the final SFOM results and
the final resulting auditing template. This auditing template is then compared with the
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audit configuration of the following security templates: (1) NIST EC, (2) NIST SSLF, and
(3) NSA SNAC.
4.2.1. Detections

Detections consist of the events that are present in the security log that identify a
malicious action after the set of malicious scenarios is simulated. As seen in Table 4.1
and Figure 4.1, of the 18 malicious scenarios 17 were detected. The detections are in bold
to indicate which switch detected each particular scenario. When the malicious scenarios
are listed, the “a” represents the misuse of administrator privileges, and the “u” represents
normal user privileges. The detailed malicious scenario results can be found in Appendix
D.
Based on the results, here are some notable findings:
1. Scenario 11u is the only scenario not detected.
2. Switch S5 has the greatest number of detected scenarios with 7
3. Switch S2 has the second most detections with 6
4. Switches S1, S4, F5, S8, and S9 has the third most detections with 3 each.
5. There were several scenarios detected by single switches:
a. Scenarios 5a, 6a, 7a, and 8a are only detected by switch S2.
b. Scenarios 2a, 3a, 9a, 12u, 14a, and 15a are only detected by switch S5.
c. Scenarios 4a, 10a, and 13u are only detected by switch F5.
d. Scenario 17u is only detected by switch S9.
e. Scenario 18u is only detected by switch S8.
6. There were several scenarios detected by multiple switches:
a. Scenarios 1a, 15a, and 16u are all detected by both switches, S1 and S4.
b. Scenarios 1a and 15a are both detected by switches S1, S2, S4, S5, S6,
S7, S8, and S9.
7. There are several switches that didn’t detect any of the scenarios:
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a. Switches F1, F2, S3, F3, F4, F7, F8, and F9 detected no scenarios.
Table 4.1: Total Detections By Switch, and Scenario Detection Coverage
Switches (Categories)
Scenarios
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0
1a
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
1 0
4 0
2 0 2 0
Yes
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
0
0 0
0 0
2 0 0 0
2a
Yes
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62
0
0 0
0 0
2 0 0 0
3a
Yes
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108
0 0
0 0
0 0 0 0
4a
Yes
1 7 2 0 0 0 6 6 86
0
0 0
1 0 35 0 0 0
5a
Yes
3 7 6 0 0 0 11 7 21
0
0 0 11 0 88 0 0 0
6a
Yes
2 8 1 0 0 0 7 8 33
0
0 0 10 0 47 0 0 0
7a
Yes
0 1 1 0 0 0 9 2 17
0
0 0 10 0 46 0 0 0
8a
Yes
3 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 6
0
0 0
5 0 12 0 0 0
9a
Yes
0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
0 0
0 0 12 0 0 0
10a
1
Yes
1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0
0
0 0
1 0 10 0 0 0
11u
No
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54
0
0 0
0 0
3 0 0 0
12u
Yes
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 108
0 0
0 0
9 0 0 0
13u
Yes
0 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 76 78
0 0 13 0 22 0 0 0
14a
Yes
0
15a
2 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 5
1 0
6 0 13 0 1 0
Yes
3
1 0 39 0 40 0 28 0
16u
1 4 0 0 0 0 9 4 12
Yes
2 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 73
0 12 0 22 0 36 7 16 0
17u
Yes
1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0
0 11 0
8 0 30 0 0 0
18u
Yes
Total Detects
3 0 6 0 0 0 3 0 7
3
1 0
1 0
3 0 3 0
17/18

4.2.2. Analysis of Detections

As Table 4.1 indicates, Switch S5 detected a large number of the scenarios. This is
mainly because S5 audits for successful object access, and most of the scenarios were
based on the premise of attempting to access other users files. Switch S2 detected a large
number of scenarios also, mainly the ones in which administrator privileges were
misused in some way. This switch audits successful account management in which
accounts are created or changed, and is very useful to audit the actions of system
administrators to ensure they are abiding by organization security policy. A few of the
scenarios were detected by several switches, and most likely the switches with the best
SFOM value will be selected, and the others not selected for the auditing template.

Several switches did not log anything at all, and after being considered by the
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organization, the decision will most likely be to not use them in the auditing template.
Decisions to include switches based on these detection findings are based on the
organizations Switch Selection Criteria (SSC).

8
7

Detects

6
5
4
3
2
1
0
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
Switches

Figure 4.1: Scenario Detections By Switch
4.2.3. Costs

Costs are obstructions to identifying the events that indicate a malicious act. They
are events captured that are not indicative of a malicious act. They conceal and obfuscate
the events necessary to identify a malicious act. They consist of Activity Costs (AC), and
False Positive Events (FPE).
4.2.3.1. Malicious Scenario Activity Cost

The Malicious Scenario Activity Costs (MSAC) is the total number of events
logged upon completion of simulating the malicious scenarios. As indicated by Table 4.2,
there is a wide variety of scenario activity costs.
Here are some notable findings:
1. Switch S5 has the highest Scenario Activity Cost at 461 events.
2. Switch S8 has the second highest Scenario Activity Cost at 409 events.
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3. Switch F5 has the third highest Scenario Activity Cost at 298 events.
4. There are several switches with no Scenario Activity Cost:
a. Switches F2, S3, F3, F7, and F9 have no Scenario Activity Cost.
Table 4.2: Scenario Activity Costs and Calculated Normal User Costs
S1 F1 S2
Malicious Scenario Activity Cost (MSAC ) 17 33 12
NU Cost (15 minutes)
1 0 0
CNUC (40 hour week) = (NU Cost * 160) 160 0 0
SAC = (MSAC + CNUC )
177 33 12

F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8
F8 S9 F9
0
0
0 95 32 461 298 26 0 130 0
409
7 47 0
0
3
1
3
1
3
7 0 0
1 0
86
2 0 0
0 480 160 480 160 480 1120 0 0 160 0 13760 320 0 0
0 480 160 575 192 941 1418 26 0 290 0 14169 327 47 0

4.2.3.2. Calculated Normal User Cost

The Calculated Normal User Cost (CNUC) is a representative of a weeks worth of
non-malicious normal user activities. It is the total number of events logged after running
the 15 minutes of non-malicious “normal user” behavior, multiplied by 160 to represent a
week. As indicated by Table 4.2, once calculated there is noticeable range of Calculated
Normal User Costs (CNUC). Here are some notable findings:
1. Switch S8 has the highest CNUC at 13,760 events.
2. Switch F5 has the second highest CNUC at 1,120 events.
3. Switches S3, S4, and S5 have the third highest CNUC at 480 events.
4. There are several switches with no CNUC:
b. Switches F1, S2, F2, S6, F6, F7, S9, and F9 have no CNUC.
4.2.3.3. Switch Activity Cost

The Switch Activity Cost (SAC) is the total number of events that appear in the
security log after running the malicious scenarios (MSAC) as well as all calculated nonmalicious normal user events (CNUC). It is calculated as the sum of the MSAC and the
CNUC. Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2 indicates that the Switch Activity Costs (SAC) were

extremely high in one switch, and significantly high in a couple others.
Here are the notable findings:
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1. Switch S8 has the highest SAC at 14,169 events.
2. Switch S8 has the second highest SAC at 1,418 events.
3. Switch F5 has the third highest SAC at 941 events.

SAC

4. Switches F2, F6, F7 and F9 have no SAC.
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Figure 4.2: Switch Activity Cost (SAC)
4.2.3.4. Switch False Positive Count

False positives are events that appear to detect a malicious scenario because they
have the same event number, but after evaluating them further it is determined that they
do not. The Switch False Positive Count (SFPC) is the total number of false positives in
the malicious scenarios and the CNUC. It is calculated as the sum of the malicious
scenarios false positives and the CNUC false positives. As indicated by Table 4.3 and
Figure 4.3, the range of Switch False Positive Counts (SFPC) closely resembles the range
of SAC’s.
Here are the notable findings:
1. Switch S8 has the highest SFPC at 6,296 events.
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2. Switch F5 has the second highest SFPC at 1,130 events.
3. Switch S4 has the third highest SFPC at 350 events.
4. Switches S1, F1, S3, F3, S6, F6, F7, F8, S9, and F9 have no SFPC.
Table 4.3: Switch False Positive Count
Scenario False Alarms
NU False Alarms(15 mins)
NU False Alarms(40 hr wk) = (NU FA's * 160)
CFPC = (Scen FA + NU FA (40 hr wk))

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7
0 0 2 0
0
0 30 28 27 10 0 0
7 0
0 0 0 0
0
0
2
1
1
7 0 0
1 0
0 0 0 0
0
0 320 160 160 1120 0 0 160 0
0 0 2 0
0
0 350 188 187 1130 0 0 167 0

S8 F8 S9 F9
216
0 0 0
38
0 0 0
6080
0 0 0
6296
0 0 0

4.2.3.5. Analysis of Costs and False Positives

As indicated by Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, several of the switches had noticeably
higher Switch Activity Costs (SAC) than the other switches, such as switches S8 and F5.
Based upon this, depending on the number of detections that switch had (which will
become evident in the SFOM), the organization may decide that it is not worth the cost to
enable these switches. Consider switch S8 for example. It is the only switch that detected
scenario 18u, which is a user running a rootkit, but at an extremely large cost. Switch S8
audits for successful startup and shutdown of processes. This enabled it to detect the
process startup of the rootkit, but in order for this switch to be successfully implemented
by an organization, a list of all authorized processes would need to be compared with the
processes logged on a workstation, which is unfeasible. The organization’s SSC, as well
as the switches SFOM would assist in their decision to include it or not in their auditing
template.

72

7000
6000

SFPC

5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
0
S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
Switches

Figure 4.3: Switch False Positive Counts (SFPC’s)

The Switch False Positive Count (SFPC) was noticeably larger for several of the
same switches that had the larger SAC’s, like S8 and F5. This makes these switches even
less appealing to the organization, and would perhaps not be selected for their auditing
template based on their SSC.
4.2.3.6. Switch Figure of Merit

The Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) is calculated by using the formula presented
in Chapter 3, as seen below:
S FOM

AuditSwitchCURRENT

⎡ SAC ⎤
⎡ SFPC ⎤
= W 1 * SDC − W 2 * ⎢
−W 3* ⎢
⎥
⎣ TAC ⎦
⎣ SAC ⎥⎦

An organization assigns weights to W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 , based upon their security
requirements and calculates a per switch SFOM. This SFOM in addition to the SSC help
the information owner design an auditing template. When comparing the SFOM’s to one
another, the higher the SFOM the better. Depending on the weights used for W 1 , W 2 ,
and W 3 , the SFOM values can be negative. In comparing two negative SFOM’s, the least
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negative value is greater, and will be the one to select between the two. In the last
chapter, all Switch Figures of Merit (SFOM) were calculated using a Microsoft Excel
Spreadsheet. A sample weight of W 1 =5, W 2 =1, W 3 =1 is used to simulate a simulated
security concern for a notional organization. After assigning the weights, the resulting
SFOM’s are calculated and provided in Table 4.4.

Table 4.4: Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM), and Values used to Calculate Them
S1
F1
S2
F2
S3
F3
S4
F4
S5
F5
S6
F6
S7
F7
S8
F8
S9
F9

SDC
0.166666667
0
0.333333333
0
0
0
0.166666667
0
0.388888889
0.166666667
0.111111111
0
0.111111111
0
0.166666667
0
0.166666667
0

SAC/TAC
0.0093914
0.0017509
0.0006367
0
0.0254682
0.0084894
0.0305088
0.0101873
0.0499284
0.0752374
0.0013795
0
0.0153871
0
0.7517907
0.0173502
0.0024938
0

SFPC/SAC
0
0
0.16666667
0
0
0
0.60869565
0.97916667
0.19872476
0.79689704
0
0
0.57586207
0
0.44435034
0
0
0

SFOM
0.823941918
-0.001750942
1.499363294
0
-0.025468244
-0.008489415
0.194128847
-0.989353964
1.695791313
-0.038801143
0.554176026
0
-0.035693578
0
-0.362807745
-0.017350241
0.830839568
0

4.2.3.7. Analysis of Switch Figures of Merit

As indicated by Table 4.4, switch S5 has the highest SFOM, followed by S2 and
S9. These SFOM’s will be used if needed for decision making by the information owner
for creating an auditing template. Switches with zero values are the results of no
detections for that switch.
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4.2.3.8. Determining the Best Auditing Template

The best auditing template is created using the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC)
and referring to Table 4.1 as well as the SFOM values in Table 4.4. The resulting auditing
template is presented in Table 4.5. In accordance with the SSC, the switches are selected
as follows:
Each switch that is the only switch to detect any given scenario, is enabled for

1.

auditing. This was the case with switches S2, S5, F5, S8, and S9.
Each set of switches that detect the same scenarios are analyzed by their

2.

SFOM value, and the one with the highest value is selected for auditing and

the others are not. S1 and S4 both detected scenarios 1a, 15a, and 16u. S1 has
a SFOM value of 0.8239 and S4 has a SFOM value of 0.1941. S4 has a
higher SFOM so it is selected for audit, and S4 is not. S6 and S7 also detected
scenarios 1a and 15a, and since S1, S5, and S8 also detect those scenarios and
they were selected using criteria number 1, so S6 and S7 are not selected.
All remaining switches that do not detect any scenarios are not selected for

3.

auditing.
Table 4.5: Selected Audit Template
S1
F1
S2
F2
S3
F3
S4
F4
S5
F5
S6
F6
S7
F7
S8
F8
S9
F9

SFOM
0.82394
-0.00175
1.49936
0.00000
-0.02547
-0.00849
0.19413
-0.98935
1.69579
-0.03880
0.55418
0.00000
-0.03569
0.00000
-0.36281
-0.01735
0.83084
0.00000

Selected Audit Template
Audit
No Audit
Audit
No Audit
No Audit
No Audit
No Audit
No Audit
Audit
Audit
No Audit
No Audit
No Audit
No Audit
Audit
No Audit
Audit
No Audit
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Criteria Followed
Followed Criteria 2 and was selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 2 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 2 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 2 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected
Followed Criteria 1, Automatically selected
Followed Criteria 3 and was NOT selected

4.2.3.9. Configuration Comparison

Now that an auditing template has been created using the SEM, it is evaluated
using the Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) and compared with existing audit
configurations. Using Microsoft Excel®, all CFOM calculations are performed and the
newly created auditing template is compared with 3 preexisting audit configurations in
security templates; NIST EC, NIST SSLF, and NSA SNAC. Based on the same sample
weight used for the switch evaluation of W 1 =5, W 2 =1, and W 3 =1, each configuration is
calculated. The resulting CFOM values are presented in Table 4.6 and Figure 4.4. It is
evident that based on the scenarios and the SSC that the custom audit configuration
performs better than existing configurations.
Table 4.6: Results of Audit Configuration Comparison
Audit Configuration
Created Auditing Template
NIST EC
NIST SSLF
NSA SNAC

CFOM Value
3.378496594
1.757262389
2.25058253
2.25058253

4
3.5

CFOM

3
2.5
2
1.5
1
0.5
0
Created Auditing
Template

NIST EC

NIST SSLF

NSA SNAC

Audit Configuration

Figure 4.4: Comparison of Configuration Figures of Merit
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4.3. Configuration Evaluation Method Results

The Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM) is used to create the best audit
configuration based on an exhaustive comparison of all possible audit configurations
CFOM values, using a program written in C++ for this experiment . The code can be seen

in Appendix F. All results from the scenarios, as well as costs are input, just as with the
Switch Evaluation Method, and the program uses the Configuration Figure of Merit
(CFOM) calculations to select a list of best audit configurations. Many configurations
were generated for each weight selected and are too numerous to list. They are provided
in Appendix E. As seen in Table 4.7, when the weight of W 1 =1, W 2 =0, and W 3 =0, the
Configuration Detection Coverage (CDC) is the only value of importance in the formula,
so switches were chosen based solely on the CDC value of 0.994 (17 out of 18 scenarios
detected). After experimenting with the weights, it is noticed that by giving the weights a
value of

W 1 =1, W 2 =0.07, and W 3 =0, would give enough weight to W 2 for a

configuration to be selected with a reduced Configuration Activity Cost (CAC) value of
16,764 while still maintaining the same CDC value. This is an example of how to adjust
the weights to achieve a lower cost while still maintaining the same detection level.
When the weights were changed to W 1 =1, W 2 =0.08, and W 3 =0.08, the weights
associated with CAC and CFPC were raised enough for the custom audit configurations
to have a significantly lower CAC and CFPC values at the expense of the CDC which
was lowered to 0.889 (16 out of 18 detections). This shows that when the weights of W 2
and W 3 were raised enough, one detection was not considered because the cost
associated with it was too high, but the costs went down significantly. Achieving an
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acceptable threshold is something that an organization would consider if they wanted to
significantly reduce costs and false positives at the expense of detections.
Table 4.7: Weight Affect on Results for Configuration Evaluation
W1
1
1
1

W2
0
0.07
0.08

W3
0
0
0.08

CDC
CAC
CFPC
0.944
17997
8320
0.944
16764
7615
0.889
3595
1319

4.4. Summary

The two methods differ in their approaches. The Switch Evaluation Method
(SEM), is based on decision making from the Switch Selection Criteria (SSC) and uses
the Switch Figure of Merit (SFOM) to assist in making those decisions. It bases the
SFOM on individual switch statistics. The Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM), uses

the Configuration Figure of Merit (CFOM) to evaluate each audit configuration possible.
It is based exclusively on calculations, and needs to be fine tuned to understand the
impact of adjusting the weights for W 1 , W 2 , and W 3 based on the selected scenarios.
Once the weights have been understood, the CEM results in a more thorough evaluation
of the audit configuration and produces more conclusive results, mainly because it does
an exhaustive evaluation of each possible configuration. The results from both change
dramatically based upon the malicious scenarios that are selected for the test. Once each
method is understood and configured within an organization, they can produce similar
results. Based on the scenarios selected in this experiment, once the weights were finetuned, the CEM appeared to give a more thorough and complete end result. It is
recommended that an organization try both methods to determine the one that suits them
best based upon their specific security guidelines.
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2. V. Conclusions
5.1. Chapter Overview

This chapter summarizes the research efforts and the research goals. First, the
impact of this research and its utility are discussed. Next, ways that it can be
implemented and follow on suggestions are proposed. Finally, the chapter ends with a
discussion of potential future research efforts.
5.2. Restatement of Research Goal

The research goal was to develop a methodology for creating a customized insider
threat auditing template based on unique organizational security requirements. This was
performed by creating metrics that were used in two separate methods for creating this
auditing template.
5.3. Research Impact

Application of the methodology developed in this research provides an
organization with a method to optimize its auditing capabilities. This increases the
organizations capability to detect and identify malicious actions early enough to mitigate
any potential damages. It can also reduce the workload required to review the audit logs
by reducing their size. Additionally, it can increase the efficiency of security
administrators ability to detect malicious activity when reviewing audit logs by
maximizing the amount of useful information they contain. Finally, it allows an
organization to be aware of what is being audited within its enterprise network and the
effectiveness of the ability to detect malicious acts.
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5.4. Suggested Implementaion

Rather than rely upon one-size-fits-all auditing configurations available in
recommended security templates, it is suggested that an organization identify its specific
insider threat security requirements and use the methodology presented in this research to
create its own custom auditing template. It is suggested that both methods proposed be
evaluated by the organization to determine the best method for satisfying those identified
security requirements. It would be very beneficial for the organization to know what is
being audited within its organizational workstations and to ensure that the auditing that is
being performed complies with its security requirements. Because security requirements
change, it is suggested that once the organization has initiated this methodology into its
security policy, that it periodically use it to reevaluate its auditing template to ensure that
it still fits their security needs. What is presented in this research is an example. It is
suggested that an organization use this example as a baseline and make it as robust as
possible by creating numerous simulated malicious scenarios and using more accurate
normal user statistics. The more robust the organization makes this methodology, the
better the results. The C++ program created for this research is provided in Appendix F,
and can be modified to give the tailored output that the organization needs to make its
decisions on an auditing template.
5.5. Future Research

There are three areas in which this research can be expanded. The first area of
future research is to apply the methodology to networked workstations and servers to
identify and customize auditing of network related communication within an
organization.
80

A second area is to expand the methodology to other networked systems that
perform various other roles such as a servers, routers, and switches. By applying the
methodology in various other capacities, it can achieve an improved awareness of the
auditing situations in those areas and allows for the optimization of auditing capabilities.
A third area is in applying the methodology to outside threats. Currently many
organizations apply auditing configurations available in widely used security templates
without knowing what they audit for and if they are effective. If this research is applied to
outside threats then perhaps their auditing can be optimized as well.
5.6. Summary

This research provides information owners a methodology for maximizing their
auditing capabilities within their organization. It provides the groundwork for building an
auditing template and for evaluating an existing auditing configuration to determine if it
meets the needs of the organizations identified security requirements. The potential exists
for the functionality to be used in a wide array of organizations.
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3. Appendix A: Simulated Malicious Insider Scenarios

Table A.1: Simulated Malicious Insider Scenarios
1a
2a
3a
4a
5a
6a
7a
8a
9a
10a
11u
12u
13u
14a
15a
16u
17u
18u
Note:

Attempt to Circumvent Auditing (clear Audit Logs) as Admin
Attempt to access users folder as Admin (Users Folder has no SACL, but file
inside does. Admin has access to folder and file)
Attempt to access a users file successfully as admin with SACL (Admin has
access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL)
Attempt to access a users file unsuccessfully as admin with SACL (Admin Does
NOT have access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL)
Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing users password
and logging in as the user
Attempt to access a users file as admin by creating an admin account to use to
mask attempts
Attempt to access a users file as admin by changing a user account to admin to
use to mask attempts
Attempt to access a users file by changing a user account to admin by placing
into admin group to use to mask attempts
Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to create a hardlink
Attempt to access a users file as admin with an SACL by attempting to create a
hardlink
Attempt to access another users folder as user (Users Folder has no SACL, but
file inside does. Admin has access to folder and file)
Attempt to access another users file as user successfully with SACL (User has
access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL)
Attempt to access another users file as user unsuccessfully with SACL (User does
not have access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL)
Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing ownership of the
file
Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to Change Security Policy
Attempt to guess Admin password by rebooting into safemode and guessing
admin password
Access a users file by booting with a boot cd and deleting password
Run a rootkit
a = administrator privilege, u = normal user privilege
4.
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5. Appendix B: Simulated Malicious Insider Scenarios Script

Simulated Malicious Scenarios Script (With Confidentiality a Primary Concern, Attempting to Access
Another Users files)
Open the folder to save all data for the scenario so that you remember what scenario you're doing
Log in as Levoy
Go to Start, Control Panel, Administrative Tools, Local Security Policy, Audit Policy, and Set Appropriate
Switch to Success and Failure, all others to "No Auditing"
1a. Attempt to Circumvent Auditing (clear Audit Logs) as Admin
Clear all audit logs
2a. Attempt to access users folder as Admin (Users Folder has no SACL, but file inside does. Admin
has access to folder and file)
Browse to "C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\User 2's Documents\User 2.txt" folder, then close it
3a. Attempt to access a users file successfully as admin with SACL (Admin has access to file, auditing
is enabled in ACL)
Browse to C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt, then close it
4a. Attempt to access a users file unsuccessfully as admin with SACL (Admin Does NOT have access
to file, auditing is enabled in ACL)
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access), It should say "Access Denied", then click OK
5a. Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing users password and logging in as
the user
Browse to Control Panel, User Accounts, and Change the Password for User 2 to "password"
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 2" with the new password you changed
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt, then close it
Log off as "User 2" and back in as "levoy"
6a. Attempt to access a users file as admin by creating an admin account to use to mask attempts
Browse to Control Panel, User Accounts, and Create an Account Called "Admin" with Admin privileges
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "Admin Account"
Browse to C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt, then close it
Log off as "Admin Account" and log on as "levoy"
Delete "Admin" Account and all it's files
7a. Attempt to access a users file as admin by changing a user account to admin to use to mask
attempts
Browse to Control Panel, User Accounts, and Change User 1 Account to have Admin Privileges
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 1"
Browse to C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt, then close it
Log off as "User 1" and log on as "levoy"
8a. Attempt to access a users file by changing a user account to admin by placing into admin group to
use to mask attempts
Browse to Control Panel, Administrative tools, Computer management, Local Users and Groups, Groups,
Administrator, and Add User 3 to the Admin Group
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 3"
Browse to C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt, then close it
Log off as "User 3" and log on as "levoy"

83

9a. Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to create a hardlink
Open a Dos prompt by going to All Programs, Accessories, Command Prompt
At the C:\ Prompt Type "fsutil hardlink create test "C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User
2.txt", it should say Hardlink created
Type edit test, it should say "test"
10a. Attempt to access a users file as admin with an SACL by attempting to create a hardlink
Open a Dos prompt by going to All Programs, Accessories, Command Prompt
At the C:\ Prompt Type "fsutil hardlink create test2 c:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt"
It should say, "Access Denied"
11u. Attempt to access another users folder as user (Users Folder has no SACL, but file inside does)
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 4"
Browse to "C:\Documents and Settings\User 2" folder, then close it
12u. Attempt to access another users file as user successfully with SACL (User has access to file,
Auditing is enabled in ACL)
Browse to C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt, then close it
13u. Attempt to access another users file as user unsuccessfully with SACL (User does not have access
to file, Auditing is enabled in ACL)
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access), then click OK
14a. Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing ownership of the file
Log off as "User 4" and log on as "levoy"
Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access), right click on it and change ownership to levoy
Then Go to the same folder, right click, and add levoy to have full access to it.
Then Browse to C:\User 2 wo Admin Access\User 2.txt, then close it
15a. Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to Change Security Policy
Log off as "User 4" and log on as "levoy"
Go to Start, Control Panel, Administrative Tools, Local Security Policy, Audit Policy, and Set all to "No
Auditing"
Attempt to browse to both C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt, and C:\User 2 wo Admin
Access (for 15a)
Categories 1 and 3 are not used in workstation, Account logon events and Directory Services
Save all logs to desktop as .evt and .csv and then drag them to appropriate folder
Shut Down the VMWare Computer
Make Sure "Snapshot 1" is loaded
Additional Scenarios
Log on as levoy, then clear audit log
16u. Attempt to guess Admin password by rebooting into safemode and guessing admin password
Reboot virtual machine into safe mode
Make 3 unsuccessful attempts to log onto the administrator account with the password "pass"
Make one successful attempt to log onto the administrator account with the password "password"
Reboot back into normal mode
17u. Access a users file by booting with a boot cd and deleting password
Reboot with boot cd in
Change User 2 password to null
Reboot without boot cd in and log onto User 2 account
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Browse to C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)
Log off as User 2
18u. Run a rootkit
Log on as levoy
Insert pen drive
Run furoot
Eject pendrive
Save all logs to desktop as .evt and .csv and then drag them to appropriate folder
Shut Down the VMWare Computer
Make Sure "Snapshot 1" is loaded
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6. Appendix C: Simulated Non-malicious Insider (Normal User) Scenarios Script

Note: This Simulated Non-malicious Insider (Normal User) Script took
15 minutes to run:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Normal User Activity Script
Log off as "levoy" and log on as "User 4"
Open Word
Type the word "text"
Save the document to the desktop
Close Word
Open Excel
Type the word "text" into the first cell
Save the document to the desktop
Close Excel
Open Internet Explorer
Try to browse to a web page
Close Internet Explorer
Open Solitaire and play one hand then exit
Open Media player and play one of the sample songs then exit
Right Click and Create a new text document on the desktop
Right Click and Create a new wave sound on the desktop
Right Click and Create a new bitmap image on the desktop
Delete these 3 files
Right click on the desktop, go to properties, settings, then change the desktop picture and
preview a screensaver
Insert a CD and browse to a file on it
Eject the CD
Insert a Pen Drive
Right Click on the desktop and create a new word document
Type "text"
Save the document to the desktop
Save the document to the pendrive
Print the document to document image writer and save it to the desktop
Close Word and Compress the file
Eject the Pendrive
Open Paint
Draw a quick picture
Save it to the desktop
Right Click on that picture and zip it to a zip file using "winzip"
Open calculator and perform 72 x 36 =, then exit
Go to Seacrh, for files and folders, and do a search for all files ending in .doc, then .txt
Open Powerpoint and create a blank slide with the word "text" on it and an imported picture
from the sample pictures folder, close it without saving
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Appendix D: Individual Scenario Results

In this Appendix the individual results of each scenario are explained. In each
figure, the item in bold with a shaded box was where the detection of the malicious act
occurred.
1. Scenario 1a: Attempt to Circumvent Auditing (Clear Audit Logs), as Admin
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a malicious user attempting

to cover his tracks by deleting any detection of the malicious acts that he
performed. It is usually one of the last actions a malicious user performs. In this
scenario, a user with administrator rights (username: levoy) attempts to delete the
audit logs, from within Eventviewer.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for policy change will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 517 in the system events category (S9).
Table A1: Results of Scenario 1a
Scenario
1a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 1
0
1 0 4 0 2 0 2 0
Yes

Results: An event 517 was logged in all of the categories (S1, S2, S3, S4, S5, S6,

S7, S8, and S9).[Figure 4.5] It can be determined by the event 517 that the audit
log was cleared by user “levoy” at 12:09:13 AM on 4/9/06. The event itself can be
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event was easy to determine since it is logged in every category,

and there are no other events logged for the scenario in most categories. This
would be a very important event to notice, because it is rare for the security audit
logs to be deleted under normal circumstances and it is very frequently used by a
malicious to cover tracks. It may not show any information about what occurred
prior to the deletion of the audit logs, but it is worth looking onto the reason that it
was performed.
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2. Scenario 2a: Attempt to access another users folder as admin (Users Folder has no

SACL, but file inside does. Admin has access to folder and file)
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user

attempting to browse to another users “My Documents” folder on a shared
workstation. While this may simply be a case of a user being curious, it could be a
malicious user trying to gain access to another users important information. In this
scenario, it is being performed by user levoy ,who has administrator rights, tries to
access C:\Documents and Settings\User2\My Documents\User
2.txt. By default, Windows XP® limits access to users files located in their

individual “C:\Documents and Settings\UserXX\My Documents”
folder to the individual user and the administrator group, and no auditing is enabled
for successful or failed attempts to access these files. For this scenario an SACL
was configured on the file “User 2.txt” to allow access by all users and log
successful and failed attempts.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (S5).
Table A.2: Results of Scenario 2a
Scenario
2a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 0
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for object access was logged as event 560. It can be

determined from the log that user “levoy” accessed “C:\Documents and
Settings\UserX\My Documents\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 09:47:39 hours. The
event itself can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” gained access to user 2’s

file, and that permission was granted because it was logged as a successful attempt
and was logged as a success audit. The access to user 2’s “Documents and
Settings\My Documents” folder was not logged because it was not enabled with
auditing through an SACL, while access to the file within it called “User 2.txt was
88

audited because it was enabled with an SACL for auditing. This audit event would
not usually show up because auditing for user files located in their individual
“Documents and Settings\My Documents “ folder is not enabled by default. In this
case it was enabled for auditing, and the logged access could mean that either the
user “levoy” simply had specific permission in the SACL to view the file, or that
they had permission because of being in a group like the administrator group. In an
instance like this, the security administrators of an organization need to look deeper
into the access to determine if it was authorized by the security policy because it
could be a completely normal occurrence of or a malicious act.
3. Scenario 3a: Attempt to access a users file successfully as admin with SACL

(Admin has access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL)
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user

attempting to browse to another users file, which has been configured with a SACL,
located on a shared workstation. The SACL controls access to the file as well as
auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the file. In this scenario,
the user “levoy” who has administrator rights attempts to access “C:\User 2 (with
Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” , which has User 2 as an owner and is
configured to allow access to user levoy, and to log all successful and failed
attempts to access it.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (S5).
Table A.3: Results of Scenario 3a
Scenario
3a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 62 0
0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for object access was logged as event 560. It can be

determined from the log that user “levoy” accessed “C:\User 2 (with Admin and
User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 09:47:52 hours. The event itself can be
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
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Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” gained access to user 2’s

file, and that they had permission to do so because it was a successful attempt and
was logged as a success audit. This could mean that either the user “levoy” simply
had specific permission in the SACL to view the file, or that they had permission
because of being in a group like the administrator group. In an instance like this,
the security administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to
determine if it the users access to the file was authorized by the security policy.
4. Scenario 4a: Attempt to access a users file unsuccessfully as admin with SACL

(Admin Does NOT have access to file, auditing is enabled in SACL)
Description: This scenario is the same as scenario 3a except the SACL does not

allow the user levoy access to the file. In this scenario, the user levoy who has
administrator access attempts to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2
Access)\User 2.txt” in which User 2 is the owner and the file is configured

without access to the user levoy and to log all successful and failed attempts to
access it.
Expected Results: It is expected that a failure audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (F5).
Table A4.: Results of Scenario 4a
Scenario
4a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A failure audit for object access was logged as event 560. It can be

determined from the log that user “levoy” attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 09:49:47 hours. The event itself can be
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to

user 2’s file, and that he/she did not have permission to do so because it was a failed
attempt that was logged as a failure audit. In an instance like this, the security
administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to determine
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why the user attempted to access an unauthorized file and if the event was an
instance of a simple mistake or a malicious attempt to gain access to an
unauthorized file.
5. Scenario 5a: Attempt to access a users file as admin with SACL by changing users

password and logging in as the user.
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider

with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a users file in which he
doesn’t have access by changing the users password. In this scenario, the user levoy
who has administrator access desires to gain access to “C:\User 2 (Only
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” and does not have access, so he/she changes

User 2’s password and then logs on as User 2 to gain access to the file.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for account management will

be logged. This is expected to be an event 628 in the account management category
(S2) showing that an account password was changed.
Table A.5: Results of Scenario 5a
Scenario
5a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
1 7 2 0 0 0 6 6 86 0
0 0 1 0 35 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for account management was logged as event 628. It can

be determined from the log that user “levoy” changed the password for the “User
2” acount on 3/25/2006 at 7:44:01 PM. Two secondary events that can be used to
determine the entire evolution of events are event 528 that shows that after the
password was changed, the “User 2” account was logged onto, and event 560 that
shows that the file “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” was then accessed
by User 2.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to

user 2’s file by changing the password to the account, and then logged onto it and
gained access to it’s files. While this approach to gaining access to a users files is
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less likely than taking ownership of the files(scenario 14a), it is still a possibility.
The organization security policy should specify a way of accounting for
administrator actions such as resetting a password, so that legitimate administrator
duties can be determined from potential malicious actions.
6. Scenario 6a: Attempt to access a users file as admin by creating an admin account

to use to mask attempts
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider

with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he
doesn’t have access. He/she will attempt to create an account with administrator
privileges to mask attempts to gain access to the user’s file. In this scenario, the
user levoy who has administrator rights desires to gain access “C:\Documents
and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” and does not have

access, so he/she creates an account with administrator rights with the username
admin, and then logs on to that account to gain access to the file.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for account management will

be logged. This is expected to be an event 628 in the account management category
(S2) showing that an account was created.
Table A.6: Results of Scenario 6a
Scenario
6a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
3 7 6 0 0 0 11 7 21 0
0 0 11 0 88 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for account management was logged as event 628. It can

be determined from the log that user “levoy” created an account named “admin” on
3/25/2006 at 7:46:15 PM. A secondary event that can be used to determine the
entire evolution of events is event 528 which is the successful logon of the account
“admin”, followed by the event 560 which is the successful access to the file
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” by the account
“admin”.
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Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to

user 2’s file and mask the effort by creating another administrator account and
using it to gain access to the file, in an effort to divert attention away from its own
account. This would not be a very complicated or likely scenario but still could
happen and in this case it was logged and relatively easily identified. Just as all
other administrator duties, the organization security policy should specify a way of
accounting for administrator actions such as creating or deleting accounts, so that
legitimate administrator duties can be determined and separated from potential
malicious actions.
7. Scenario 7a: Attempt to access a users file as admin by changing a user account to

admin to use to mask attempts
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider

with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he
doesn’t have access. He/she will attempt to change a normal user account to an
administrator account to mask attempts to gain access to the user’s file. In this
scenario, the user levoy who has administrator access desires to gain access
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” and does not have
access, so he/she changes the account User 1, which is a normal user account, to
have administrator rights and then logs onto that account to gain access to the file.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for account management will

be logged. This is expected to be an event 636 in the account management category
(S2) showing that the account “User 1” was changed to have administrator rights.
Table A.7: Results of Scenario 7a
Scenario
7a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
2 8 1 0 0 0 7 8 33 0
0 0 10 0 47 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for account management was logged as event 636. It can

be determined from the log that user “levoy” changed account with ID: S-1-5-21484763869-152049171-839522115-1004 (which can be determined to be User 1
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from event 528, see appendix A) to have administrator privileges on 3/25/2006 at
7:55:08 PM. A secondary event that can be used to determine the entire evolution
of events is event 528 which is the successful logon of the account “User 1”,
followed by the event 560 which is the successful access to the file “C:\Documents
and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” by the account “User 1”.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to

user 2’s file and mask the effort by changing a user account to an administrator
account and using it to gain access to the file, in an effort to divert attention away
from its own account. This would not be a very complicated or likely scenario but
still could happen and in this case it was logged and relatively easily identified.
Just as all other administrator duties, the organization security policy should specify
a way of accounting for administrator actions such as creating or deleting accounts,
so that legitimate administrator duties can be determined and separated from
potential malicious actions.
8. Scenario 8a: Attempt to access a users file by changing a user account to admin by

placing into admin group to mask attempts to access users file
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider

with administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he
doesn’t have access. He/she will attempt to change a normal user account to an
administrator account to mask attempts to gain access to the user’s file. In this
scenario, the user levoy who has administrator access desires to gain access to
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User
2.txt” and does not have access, so he/she changes the account User 3, which is a

normal user account, to have administrator rights by adding it to the administrator
group and then logs onto that account to gain access to the file.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for account management will

be logged. This is expected to be an event 636 in the account management category
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(S2) showing that the account “User 3” was changed to have administrator rights by
being added to the administrator group.
Table A.8: Results of Scenario 8a
Scenario
8a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 1 1 0 0 0 9 2 17 0
0 0 10 0 46 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for account management was logged as event 636. It can

be determined from the log that user “levoy” added account with ID: S-1-5-21484763869-152049171-839522115-1006 (which can be determined to be User 3
from event 528, see appendix A) to the administrator group on 3/25/2006 at 7:57:18
PM. A secondary event that can be used to determine the entire evolution of events
is event 528 which is the successful logon of the account “User 3”, followed by the
event 560 which is the successful access to the file “C:\Documents and
Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt” by the account “User 3”.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted to gain access to

user 2’s file and mask the effort by changing a user account to an administrator
account and using it to gain access to the file, in an effort to divert attention away
from its own account. This would not be a very complicated or likely scenario but
still could happen and in this case it was logged and relatively easily identified.
Just as all other administrator duties, the organization security policy should specify
a way of accounting for administrator actions such as creating or deleting accounts,
so that legitimate administrator duties can be determined and separated from
potential malicious actions. It is also very important for security administrators to
pay close attention to the members of the administrator group.
9. Scenario 9a: Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to create a

hardlink
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider

with administrator rights attempting mask attempts to access a users file by creating
a hard link to a users file from the command prompt. A hardlink is a link that
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points to a particular file or directory and has all the same rights as the file itself. In
this scenario, the user levoy who has administrator rights desires to gain access to
“C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt”. He/she goes to
the command prompt and types "fsutil hardlink create test "C:\Documents and
Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt" which will create a hardlink to the file
"C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My Documents\User 2.txt" named “test”.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 568 in the object access category (S5)
showing that a successful attempt to make a hard link was performed.

Table A.9: Results of Scenario 9a
Scenario
9a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
3 2 0 0 0 0 2 1 6
0
0 0 5 0 12 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for object access was logged as event 568. It can be

determined from the log that user “levoy” successfully created a hard link to the file
on 3/25/2006 at 9:59:58 PM.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” successfully attempted to

gain access to user 2’s file by creating a hardlink. This is common way that
malicious insiders gain access to files, and then delete the hardlink because if the
file has an SACL enabled, it will log this event but it will be less noticeable than
simple access to the file.[add ref]. Event 568 is an event that security
administrators need to be aware of and look for on a regular basis because it is
seldom used under normal circumstances.
10. Scenario 10a: Attempt to access a users file as admin with an SACL by

attempting to create a hardlink
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a malicious insider with

administrator rights attempting to gain access to a user’s file in which he does not
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have access by attempting to create a hard link to the users file from the command
prompt. . The file has an SACL restricting access to only User 2. In this scenario,
the user levoy who has administrator access desires to gain access to the file
“C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt" and does not have access. He/she goes
to the command prompt and types " fsutil hardlink create test2 "c:\User 2 (Only
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt" which will attempt to create a hardlink to the file "fsutil
hardlink create test2 "c:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt" named “test2”.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 568 in the object access category (S5)
showing that a successful attempt to make a hard link was performed.

Table A.10: Results of Scenario 10a
Scenario
10a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0
1
0 0 0 0 12 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A failure audit for object access was logged as event 560. It can be

determined from the log that user “levoy” unsuccessfully attempted to created a
hard link to the file on 3/25/2006 at 10:00:31 PM.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” unsuccessfully attempted

to gain access to user 2’s file by creating a hardlink. This was an unexpected result.
Instead of an event 568 failure hardlink attempt, an event 560 failure object access
was logged. Just as scenario 9a, this is common way that malicious insiders gain
access to files, and then delete the hardlink because if the file has an SACL enabled,
it will log this event but it will be less noticeable than simple access to the file.[add
ref]. Security administrators need to regularly review audit logs and look for event
560 failure object access to determine if they are simple mistakes or if a possible
malicious insider is browsing another users files.
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11. Scenario 11u: Attempt to access another users folder as user (Users Folder has

no SACL, but file inside does have SACL)
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious insider

with normal user rights attempting to gain access to another user’s file located in
their personal “My Documents” folder on a shared workstation. It would be
indicative of a user either being curious and browsing files on a workstation, or
trying to gain access to personal information for malicious reasons. He/she should
not be able to browse to this folder because normal users are not allowed into other
users folders by default. In this scenario, the user User 4 who has normal user
access desires to gain access to “C:\Documents and Settings\User 2\My
Documents\User 2.txt". He/she simply tries to browse to it.
Expected Results: It is expected that a failure audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (F5)
showing that a failed object access attempt was performed.

Table A.11: Results of Scenario 11u
Scenario
11u

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
1 0 0 0 0 0 2 1 0
0
0 0 1 0 10 0 0 0
No

Results: There was nothing logged for this scenario to indicate what occurred.
Discussion: Since normal user access to other users “C:\Documents and

Settings\User XX\My Documents” folder is not allowed by default on Windows
XP®, the user in this scenario was blocked from gaining access to this folder. Also
by default there is nothing logged for attempts to gain access, so there was no
evidence of the attempt. Even though the file “User 2.txt” itself was enabled for
auditing, the folder “My Documents” was not. If an organizations security
administrators want to know if there are failed or successful attempts to gain access
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to other users files then they need to enable auditing on those files and have an
SACL on them as well.
12. Scenario 12u: Attempt to access another users file as user successfully with

SACL (User has access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL)
Description: This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with

normal user rights attempting to browse to another users file on a shared
workstation. The file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to
the file as well as auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the
file. In this scenario, the user “User 4” who has normal user rights attempts to
access the file “C:\User 2 (with Admin and User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” which User
2 is an owner. The file is configured to allow access to user “User 4”, and to log all
successful and failed attempts to access it.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (S5).
Table A.12: Results of Scenario 12u
Scenario
12u

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 54 0
0 0 0 0 3 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A success audit for object access was logged as event 560. It can be

determined from the log that user “User 4” accessed “C:\User 2 (with Admin and
User 4 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 10:01:52 hours. The event itself can be
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “User 4” gained access to user 2’s

file, and that they had permission to do so because it was a successful attempt and
was logged as a success audit. This could mean that either the user “User 4” simply
had specific permission in the SACL to view the file, or that they had permission
because of being in a group like the administrator group. In an instance like this,
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the security administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to
determine if it the users access to the file was authorized by the security policy.
13. Scenario 13u: Attempt to access another users file as user unsuccessfully with

SACL (User does not have access to file, Auditing is enabled in SACL)
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a malicious user with

normal user rights attempting to browse to another users file on a shared
workstation. The file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to
the file as well as auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the
file. In this scenario, the user “User 4” who has normal user rights attempts to
access the file “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt”, in which User 2 is the
owner and the file is configured to not allow access to “User 4”, and to log all
successful and failed attempts to access it.
Expected Results: It is expected that a failure audit for object access will be

logged. This is expected to be an event 560 in the object access category (F5).

Table A.13: Results of Scenario 13u
Scenario
13u

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 108 0 0 0 0 9 0 0 0
Yes

Results: A failure audit for object access was logged as event 560. It can be

determined from the log that user “User 4” attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only
User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on 3/25/2006 at 10:01:57 hours. The event itself can be
found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.

Discussion: This event determines that the user “User 4” attempted to gain access

to user 2’s file, and that he/she did not have permission to do so because it was a
failed attempt that was logged as a failure audit. In an instance like this, the
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security administrators of an organization need to look deeper into the event to
determine why the user attempted to access an unauthorized file and if the event
was an instance of a simple mistake or a malicious attempt to gain access to an
unauthorized file.
14. Scenario 14a: Attempt to access a users file as Admin with SACL by changing

ownership of the file
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user

with administrator rights attempting to gain access to another users file on a shared
workstation. The file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to
the file as well as auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the
file. In this scenario, the user “levoy” who has administrator rights attempts to
access the file “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt”, in which User 2 is the
owner and it is configured without access to “levoy” and to log all successful and
failed attempts to access it. The user “levoy” attempts to gain access by taking
ownership of the file and giving himself access to it.
Expected Results: It is expected that most likely initially a failure audit for object

access will be logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the
object access category (F5). Then it is expected that a success audit for object
access will be logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.
Table A.14: Results of Scenario 14a
Scenario
14a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
0 1 0 0 0 0 4 1 76 78 0 0 13 0 22 0 0 0
Yes

Results: The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object

access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the
object access category (S5). Secondary audit log indications show that a failure
audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5). Another secondary
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audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the
privilege use category. It can be determined from the logs that “levoy”
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours. The events
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully

to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave
himself access. This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used. If the confidentiality of
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category
object access. Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy.
15. Scenario 15a: Attempt to access a users file as admin by attempting to change

the Security Policy
Description: This type of scenario is representative of a possible malicious user

with administrator rights disabling all auditing by changing the local security policy
to mask attempts to gain access to another users file on a shared workstation. The
file has been configured with an SACL, which controls access to the file as well as
auditing all successful and unsuccessful attempts to access the file. In this scenario,
the user “levoy” who has administrator rights disables auditing to mask his/her
attempts to access the file “C:\User 2 (With Admin and User 4)\User 2.txt”, in
which User 2 is the owner and it is configured to allow access to “levoy” and to log
all successful and failed attempts to access it.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access
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category (F5). Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be
logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.
Table A.15: Results of Scenario 15a
Scenario
15a

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
2 1 1 0 0 0 3 1 5
0
1 0 6 0 13 0 1 0
Yes

Results: This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with normal

user rights attempting to elevate privileges to administrator by rebooting the
computer into safe mode and trying to guess the password to the administrator
account. The administrator account, if not removed or renamed, is created at the
time of installing Windows XP®. It is a way of logging into the workstation in safe
mode, and there is no limit to the number of failed attempts to try to log into it. In
this scenario, a user will reboot the virtual machine and make three failed attempts
to guess the administrator password before getting it right and logging in.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully

to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave
himself access. This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used. If the confidentiality of
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category
object access. Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy.
16. Scenario 16a: Attempt to guess Admin password by rebooting into safemode and

guessing admin password
Description: This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with

normal user rights attempting to elevate privileges to administrator by rebooting the
computer into safe mode and trying to guess the password to the administrator
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account. The administrator account, if not removed or renamed, is created at the
time of installing Windows XP®. It is a way of logging into the workstation in safe
mode, and there is no limit to the number of failed attempts to try to log into it. In
this scenario, a user will reboot the virtual machine and make three failed attempts
to guess the administrator password before getting it right and logging in.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access
category (F5). Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be
logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.
Table A.16: Results of Scenario 16u
Scenario
16u

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
1 4 0 0 0 0 9 4 12 3
1 0 39 0 40 0 28 0
Yes

Results: The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object

access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the
object access category (S5). Secondary audit log indications show that a failure
audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5). Another secondary
audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the
privilege use category. It can be determined from the logs that “levoy”
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours. The events
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully

to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave
himself access. This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs
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to determine that the take ownership privilege was used. If the confidentiality of
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category
object access. Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy.
17. Scenario 17u: Access a users file by booting with a bootable cd and deleting

password
Description: This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with

normal user rights attempting to gain access to a users file by rebooting the
computer using a bootable cd, changing the users password, then rebooting and
gaining access to the users file with the new password. The cd contains a
Windows® registry editor and boots into a Linux shell. In this scenario, a user will
reboot the virtual machine with the bootable cd inserted. The user will then use the
Windows® registry editor on the cd to change the “User 2” account to have no
password. Then the user will reboot again, log into the “User 2” account, and gain
access to the “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)” file.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access
category (F5). Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be
logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.
Table A.17: Results of Scenario 17u
Scenario
17u

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
2 0 0 0 0 0 35 0 73 0 12 0 22 0 36 7 16 0
Yes

Results: The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object

access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the
object access category (S5). Secondary audit log indications show that a failure
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audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5). Another secondary
audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the
privilege use category. It can be determined from the logs that “levoy”
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours. The events
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully

to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave
himself access. This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used. If the confidentiality of
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category
object access. Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy.
18. Scenario 18u: Run a rootkit
Description: This scenario is representative of a possible malicious user with

normal user rights attempting to elevate privileges by running a rootkit. In this
scenario, user “levoy” will insert a pen drive with a rootkit executable file on it.
The rootkit is called “Fu_Rootkit”, and is a common way of inserting a backdoor
into a workstation to enable enumeration at a later time. The user “levoy” will then
run the executable “fu.exe” which will install the rootkit, eject the pen drive, and
log off.
Expected Results: It is expected that a success audit for object access will be

logged as user “levoy” tries to access the file as an event 560 in the object access
category (F5). Then it is expected that a success audit for object access will be
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logged as an event 560 with the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) indicated in the privileges section.
Table A.18: Results of Scenario 18u
Scenario
18u

S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S4 F4 S5 F5 S6 F6 S7 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9 Detected
1 1 0 0 0 0 2 1 0
0 11 0 8 0 30 0 0 0
Yes

Results: The primary audit log indication was a success audit indicating object

access with the take ownership privilege (SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) used in the
object access category (S5). Secondary audit log indications show that a failure
audit for object access was logged as event 560 prior to the take ownership
privilege being exercised in the object access category (F5). Another secondary
audit log indication was that the take ownership privilege
(SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege) was exercised was logged as event 578 in the
privilege use category. It can be determined from the logs that “levoy”
unsuccessfully attempted to access “C:\User 2 (Only User 2 Access)\User 2.txt” on
3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours, then used the take ownership privilege to take
ownership of the file and accessed it on 3/25/2006 at 10:02:42 hours. The events
can be found in Appendix A, listed under the scenario number.
Discussion: This event determines that the user “levoy” attempted unsuccessfully

to gain access to user 2’s file first, and then took ownership of the file and gave
himself access. This scenario requires close evaluation of the event 560 audit logs
to determine that the take ownership privilege was used. If the confidentiality of
particular files on workstations is a concern of the organization, then SACL’s should
be put on those files and auditing should be enabled for success in the category
object access. Potential abuse of administrator privileges such as what occurred in
this scenario is why auditing should be used to keep an eye on administrators to
ensure that they are abiding by the organizations security policy.
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7. Appendix E: CEM Method Output from the Program Written in C++

The Configuration Evaluation Method (CEM) is used to create an optimal audit
configuration based on an exhaustive comparison of all possible audit configurations,
using a program written in C++ for this experiment. The program’s output can be seen
below:
1. The output using weights of W 1 =1, W 2 =0, and W 3 =0:
Reading cost.csv file......done.
Reading primary.csv file......done.
Reading secondary.csv file......done.
W1 = 1.0000 W2 = 0.0000 W3 = 0.0000
Per Switch
Switch: 0
Switch: 1
Switch: 2
Switch: 3
Switch: 4
Switch: 5
Switch: 6
Switch: 7
Switch: 8
Switch: 9
Switch: 10
Switch: 11
Switch: 12
Switch: 13
Switch: 14
Switch: 15
Switch: 16
Switch: 17

Calculations:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
177 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
33 FPC:
DC: 0.3333 AC:
12 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
480 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
160 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
575 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
192 FPC:
DC: 0.3889 AC:
941 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC: 1418 FPC:
DC: 0.1111 AC:
26 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.1111 AC:
290 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC: 14169 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
327 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
47 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:

0
0
2
0
0
0
350
188
187
1130
0
0
167
0
6296
0
0
0

AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:

0.0094
0.0018
0.0006
0.0000
0.0255
0.0085
0.0305
0.0102
0.0499
0.0752
0.0014
0.0000
0.0154
0.0000
0.7518
0.0174
0.0025
0.0000

FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:

0.0000
0.0000
0.1667
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.6087
0.9792
0.1987
0.7969
0.0000
0.0000
0.5759
0.0000
0.4444
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

NIST EC SwitchID:28882
DC: 0.444 AC: 837 AC/TC: 0.044 FPC: 352 FPC/AC: 0.421 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.444444
Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9
Total Switches On: 5
NIST SSLF SwitchID:3CD92
DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.611111
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9
Total Switches On: 10
SNAC
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DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.611111
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 12
Top Ten Switches based upon W1=1.000000 W2=0.000000 W3=0.000000:
Switch Rank: 1 SwitchID:08B0A
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 6
Switch Rank: 2 SwitchID:08B0B
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 3 SwitchID:08B0E
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 F8 S9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 4 SwitchID:08B0F
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S8 F8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 8
Switch Rank: 5 SwitchID:08B1A
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 6 SwitchID:08B1B
DC: 0.944 AC: 17162 AC/TC: 0.911 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.464 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 8
Switch Rank: 7 SwitchID:08B1E
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 F8 S9
Total Switches On: 8
Switch Rank: 8 SwitchID:08B1F
DC: 0.944 AC: 17489 AC/TC: 0.928 FPC: 7965 FPC/AC: 0.455 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 F7 S8 F8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 9
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Switch Rank: 9 SwitchID:08B2A
DC: 0.944 AC: 17452 AC/TC: 0.926 FPC: 8132 FPC/AC: 0.466 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S7 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 10 SwitchID:08B2B
DC: 0.944 AC: 17452 AC/TC: 0.926 FPC: 8132 FPC/AC: 0.466 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.944444
Switches on: S2 S4 S5 F5 S7 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 8

2. The output using weights of W 1 =1, W 2 =0.07, and W 3 =0:
Reading cost.csv file......done.
Reading primary.csv file......done.
Reading secondary.csv file......done.
W1 = 1.0000 W2 = 0.0700 W3 = 0.0000
Per Switch
Switch: 0
Switch: 1
Switch: 2
Switch: 3
Switch: 4
Switch: 5
Switch: 6
Switch: 7
Switch: 8
Switch: 9
Switch: 10
Switch: 11
Switch: 12
Switch: 13
Switch: 14
Switch: 15
Switch: 16
Switch: 17

Calculations:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
177 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
33 FPC:
DC: 0.3333 AC:
12 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
480 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
160 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
575 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
192 FPC:
DC: 0.3889 AC:
941 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC: 1418 FPC:
DC: 0.1111 AC:
26 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.1111 AC:
290 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC: 14169 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
327 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
47 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:

0
0
2
0
0
0
350
188
187
1130
0
0
167
0
6296
0
0
0

AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:

0.0094
0.0018
0.0006
0.0000
0.0255
0.0085
0.0305
0.0102
0.0499
0.0752
0.0014
0.0000
0.0154
0.0000
0.7518
0.0174
0.0025
0.0000

FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:

0.0000
0.0000
0.1667
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.6087
0.9792
0.1987
0.7969
0.0000
0.0000
0.5759
0.0000
0.4444
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

NIST EC SwitchID:28882
DC: 0.444 AC: 837 AC/TC: 0.044 FPC: 352 FPC/AC: 0.421 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.441336
Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9
Total Switches On: 5
NIST SSLF SwitchID:3CD92
DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.601900
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9
Total Switches On: 10
SNAC
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DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.601900
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 12
Top Ten Switches based upon W1=1.000000 W2=0.070000 W3=0.000000:
Switch Rank: 1 SwitchID:2830A
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 6
Switch Rank: 2 SwitchID:2830B
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 3 SwitchID:2831A
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 4 SwitchID:2831B
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F7 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 8
Switch Rank: 5 SwitchID:2834A
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 6 SwitchID:2834B
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 8
Switch Rank: 7 SwitchID:2835A
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 F7 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 8
Switch Rank: 8 SwitchID:2835B
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 S5 F5 F6 F7 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 9
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Switch Rank: 9 SwitchID:2C30A
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 F2 S5 F5 S8 S9
Total Switches On: 7
Switch Rank: 10 SwitchID:2C30B
DC: 0.944 AC: 16764 AC/TC: 0.889 FPC: 7615 FPC/AC: 0.454 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.882181
Switches on: S1 S2 F2 S5 F5 S8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 8

3. The output using weights of W 1 =1, W 2 =0.08, and W 3 =0.08:
Reading cost.csv file......done.
Reading primary.csv file......done.
Reading secondary.csv file......done.
W1 = 1.0000 W2 = 0.0800 W3 = 0.0800
Per Switch
Switch: 0
Switch: 1
Switch: 2
Switch: 3
Switch: 4
Switch: 5
Switch: 6
Switch: 7
Switch: 8
Switch: 9
Switch: 10
Switch: 11
Switch: 12
Switch: 13
Switch: 14
Switch: 15
Switch: 16
Switch: 17

Calculations:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
177 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
33 FPC:
DC: 0.3333 AC:
12 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
480 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
160 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
575 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
192 FPC:
DC: 0.3889 AC:
941 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC: 1418 FPC:
DC: 0.1111 AC:
26 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.1111 AC:
290 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC: 14169 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
327 FPC:
DC: 0.1667 AC:
47 FPC:
DC: 0.0000 AC:
0 FPC:

0
0
2
0
0
0
350
188
187
1130
0
0
167
0
6296
0
0
0

AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:
AC/TC:

0.0094
0.0018
0.0006
0.0000
0.0255
0.0085
0.0305
0.0102
0.0499
0.0752
0.0014
0.0000
0.0154
0.0000
0.7518
0.0174
0.0025
0.0000

FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:
FPC/AC:

0.0000
0.0000
0.1667
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000
0.6087
0.9792
0.1987
0.7969
0.0000
0.0000
0.5759
0.0000
0.4444
0.0000
0.0000
0.0000

NIST EC SwitchID:28882
DC: 0.444 AC: 837 AC/TC: 0.044 FPC: 352 FPC/AC: 0.421 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.407248
Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9
Total Switches On: 5
NIST SSLF SwitchID:3CD92
DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.546713
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9
Total Switches On: 10
SNAC

SwitchID:3CDD3

112

DC: 0.611 AC: 2480 AC/TC: 0.132 FPC: 1670 FPC/AC: 0.673 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.546713
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 12
Top Ten Switches based upon W1=1.000000 W2=0.080000 W3=0.080000:
Switch Rank: 1 SwitchID:3B386
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9
Total Switches On: 10
Switch Rank: 2 SwitchID:3B387
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 11
Switch Rank: 3 SwitchID:3B396
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F7 F8 S9
Total Switches On: 11
Switch Rank: 4 SwitchID:3B397
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F7 F8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 12
Switch Rank: 5 SwitchID:3B3C6
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F8 S9
Total Switches On: 11
Switch Rank: 6 SwitchID:3B3C7
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 12
Switch Rank: 7 SwitchID:3B3D6
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F7 F8 S9
Total Switches On: 12
Switch Rank: 8 SwitchID:3B3D7
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F6 F7 F8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 13
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Switch Rank: 9 SwitchID:3F386
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9
Total Switches On: 11
Switch Rank: 10 SwitchID:3F387
DC: 0.889 AC: 3621 AC/TC: 0.192 FPC: 1319 FPC/AC: 0.364 TC: 18847 FOM:
0.844378
Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S3 F3 S5 F5 S6 F8 S9 F9
Total Switches On: 12
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8. Appendix F: C++ Code for CFOM Program Written for this Experiment
#include
#include
#include
#include
#include

"stdafx.h"
<stdio.h>
<stdlib.h>
<math.h>
<string.h>

int main(int argc, char* argv[])
{
char CostLine[18][100];
char PrimaryLine[18][100];
char SecondaryLine[18][100];
char *Value[19];
char *fp;
char line[120];
char *p;
unsigned int Cost[18][18];
unsigned int Primary[18][18];
unsigned int Secondary[18][18];
unsigned int RowSum[18];
unsigned int ColSum[18];
unsigned char i;
unsigned char j;
unsigned char detected;
float sdc[18];
unsigned int sac[18];
unsigned int sfpc[18];
float dc;
unsigned int ac;
unsigned int fpc[18];
unsigned int tfpc;
unsigned long Top20Switches[21];
float Top20DC[21];
unsigned int Top20AC[21];
unsigned int Top20FPC[21];
float Top20FOM[21];
unsigned long SwitchID;
unsigned long SwitchMask[18];
unsigned long SwitchIMask[18];
unsigned int SwitchIndex[18];
unsigned char Detected[18];
unsigned int FP[18];
unsigned int NUCost[18];
unsigned int NUFP[18];
unsigned int TC;
unsigned int AC;
unsigned int FPC;
float W1;
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float W2;
float W3;
float ACTC;
float FPCAC;
float FOM;
unsigned int
unsigned int
unsigned int
unsigned int

npo;
n;
found;
totalsw;

FILE *costfile;
FILE *primaryfile;
FILE *secondaryfile;
printf("Reading cost.csv file...");
/*costfile=fopen("d:\\cost.csv","r");*/
costfile=fopen("./cost.csv","r");
if(costfile==NULL)
{
printf("\n Error cannot open file cost.csv\a ");
exit(0);
}
/* get all 18 lines */
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
fgets(CostLine[i],99,costfile);
}
fclose(costfile);
printf("...done.\n");
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
fp = CostLine[i];
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
Value[j]=strtok(fp,",");
fp+=strlen(fp)+1;
Cost[i][j]=atoi(Value[j]);
}
}
printf("Reading primary.csv file...");
/* primaryfile=fopen("d:\\primary.csv","r"); */
primaryfile=fopen("./primary.csv","r");
if(primaryfile==NULL)
{
printf("\n Error cannot open file primary.csv\a ");
exit(0);
}
/* get all 18 lines */
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
fgets(PrimaryLine[i],99,primaryfile);
}
fclose(primaryfile);
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printf("...done.\n");
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
fp = PrimaryLine[i];
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
Value[j]=strtok(fp,",");
fp+=strlen(fp)+1;
Primary[i][j]=atoi(Value[j]);
}
}
printf("Reading secondary.csv file...");
/* secondaryfile=fopen("d:\\secondary.csv","r"); */
secondaryfile=fopen("./secondary.csv","r");
if(secondaryfile==NULL)
{
printf("\n Error cannot open file secondary.csv\a ");
exit(0);
}
/* get all 18 lines */
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
fgets(SecondaryLine[i],99,secondaryfile);
}
fclose(secondaryfile);
printf("...done.\n");
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
fp = SecondaryLine[i];
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
Value[j]=strtok(fp,",");
fp+=strlen(fp)+1;
Secondary[i][j]=atoi(Value[j]);
}
}
fprintf(stderr,"Please enter the value for W1: ");
p = gets (line);
if (p == NULL)
{
printf("ERROR reading user input for W1!\n");
exit(0);
}
else
{
W1 = (float)atof(line);
}
/* printf("W1 = %5.4f\n",W1); */
fprintf(stderr,"Please enter the value for W2: ");
p = gets (line);
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if (p == NULL)
{
printf("ERROR reading user input for W2!\n");
exit(0);
}
else
{
W2 = (float)atof(line);
}
/* printf("W2 = %5.4f\n",W2); */
fprintf(stderr,"Please enter the value for W3: ");
p = gets (line);
if (p == NULL)
{
printf("ERROR reading user input for W3!\n");
exit(0);
}
else
{
W3 = (float)atof(line);
}
printf("\nW1 = %5.4f W2 = %5.4f W3 = %5.4f\n",W1,W2,W3);
for(i=0; i<10; i++)
{
Top20Switches[i]=(unsigned long)0;
Top20DC[i]=(float)0.0;
Top20AC[i]=0;
Top20FPC[i]=0;
Top20FOM[i]=(float)0.0;
}
/* false positives for given scenarios */
FP[0]=0;
FP[1]=0;
FP[2]=2;
FP[3]=0;
FP[4]=0;
FP[5]=0;
FP[6]=30;
FP[7]=28;
FP[8]=27;
FP[9]=10;
FP[10]=0;
FP[11]=0;
FP[12]=7;
FP[13]=0;
FP[14]=216;
FP[15]=0;
FP[16]=0;
FP[17]=0;
/* normal use cost and false positives for 40 hour week */
NUCost[0]=160;
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NUCost[1]=0;
NUCost[2]=0;
NUCost[3]=0;
NUCost[4]=480;
NUCost[5]=160;
NUCost[6]=480;
NUCost[7]=160;
NUCost[8]=480;
NUCost[9]=1120;
NUCost[10]=0;
NUCost[11]=0;
NUCost[12]=160;
NUCost[13]=0;
NUCost[14]=13760;
NUCost[15]=320;
NUCost[16]=0;
NUCost[17]=0;
NUFP[0]=0;
NUFP[1]=0;
NUFP[2]=0;
NUFP[3]=0;
NUFP[4]=0;
NUFP[5]=0;
NUFP[6]=320;
NUFP[7]=160;
NUFP[8]=160;
NUFP[9]=1120;
NUFP[10]=0;
NUFP[11]=0;
NUFP[12]=160;
NUFP[13]=0;
NUFP[14]=6080;
NUFP[15]=0;
NUFP[16]=0;
NUFP[17]=0;
/*
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
printf("Row %d: ",i);
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
printf("%d,",Cost[i][j]);
}
printf("\n");
}
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
printf("Row %d: ",i);
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
printf("%d,",Primary[i][j]);
}
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printf("\n");
}
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
printf("Row %d: ",i);
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
printf("%d,",Secondary[i][j]);
}
printf("\n");
}
*/
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
RowSum[i]=0;
ColSum[i]=0;
}
TC=0;
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
RowSum[i]+=Cost[i][j];
ColSum[i]+=Cost[j][i];
TC+=Cost[i][j];
}
TC+=NUCost[i];
}
/*
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
printf("Index: %d RowSum: %d ColSum:
%d\n",i,RowSum[i],ColSum[i]);
}
*/
/* per switch (column) calculations */
printf("\nPer Switch Calculations:\n");
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
detected=0;
sac[i]=0;
sfpc[i]=0;
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
if(Primary[j][i] > 0)
{
detected++;
}
sac[i]+=Cost[j][i];
}
sdc[i]=((float)detected)/((float)18);
AC=sac[i]+NUCost[i];
FPC=FP[i]+NUFP[i];
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if(AC > 0)
{
printf("Switch: %2d DC: %5.4f AC: %5d FPC: %5d AC/TC: %5.4f
FPC/AC: %5.4f\n",i,sdc[i],AC,FPC,
(float)AC/(float)TC,(float)FPC/(float)AC);
}
else
{
printf("Switch: %2d DC: %5.4f AC: %5d FPC: %5d AC/TC: %5.4f
FPC/AC: 0.0000\n",i,sdc[i],AC,FPC,
(float)AC/(float)TC);
}
}
/* initialize switch mask and index */
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
SwitchMask[i] = 0x00001 << i;
SwitchIMask[i] = 0x20000 >> i;
SwitchIndex[i] = 17-i;
}
/*
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
printf("Switch: %d Mask: %05lX IMask: %05lX Index:
%d\n",i,SwitchMask[i],SwitchIMask[i],SwitchIndex[i]);
}
*/
for(i=0; i<20; i++)
{
Top20Switches[i]=(unsigned long)0;
Top20DC[i]=(float)0.0;
Top20AC[i]=0;
Top20FPC[i]=0;
Top20FOM[i]=(float)-100.0;
}
/*for(SwitchID=0; SwitchID<262144; SwitchID++)*/
for(SwitchID=0; SwitchID<262144; SwitchID++)
{
/* for each unique switch setting */
/* identify all switches that are on */
/* clear detection information */
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
Detected[i]=0;
}
ac=0;
tfpc=0;
for(i=0; i<18; i++)
{
/* consider all switches */
if(SwitchIMask[i] & SwitchID)
{
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/* switch is on, so see what it contributes */
/* switch 0 = column 18 */
/* switch 1 = column 17 */
/* switch 17 = column 1 */
/* printf("SwitchID %05lX has Switch %d
set\n",SwitchID,i); */
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
/* walk rows j for switch i */
if(Primary[j][i] > 0)
{
Detected[j]=1;
}
ac+=Cost[j][i];
}
ac+=NUCost[i];
tfpc+=(FP[i]+NUFP[i]);
}
}
detected=0;
for(i=0;i<18;i++)
{
fpc[i]=0;
/* walk rows */
if(Detected[i])
{
/* this row is detected */
detected++;
}
}
dc=((float)detected)/((float)18);
ACTC = (float)ac/(float)TC;
FPCAC = (float)tfpc/(float)ac;
FOM = (W1*dc) - (W2*ACTC) - (W3*FPCAC);
/* printf("SwitchID:%05lX DC: %4.3f AC: %d FPC: %d TC: %d FOM:
%8.6f\n",SwitchID,dc,ac,tfpc,TC,FOM);*/
found=0;
for(i=0; (i<20)&&(!found); i++)
{
if(FOM > Top20FOM[i])
{
/*printf("i: %d SwitchID:%05lX DC: %4.3f AC: %d FPC: %d TC: %d
FOM: %8.6f is better than\nSwitchID:%05lX DC: %4.3f AC: %d FPC: %d TC:
%d FOM:
%8.6f\n",i,SwitchID,dc,ac,tfpc,TC,FOM,Top20Switches[0],Top20DC[0],Top20
AC[0],Top20FPC[0],TC,Top20FOM[0]);*/
for(j=0; j<(20-i); j++)
{
npo=20-j;
n=19-j;
Top20Switches[npo]=Top20Switches[n];
Top20DC[npo]=Top20DC[n];
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Top20AC[npo]=Top20AC[n];
Top20FPC[npo]=Top20FPC[n];
Top20FOM[npo]=Top20FOM[n];
}
Top20Switches[i]=SwitchID;
Top20DC[i]=dc;
Top20AC[i]=ac;
Top20FPC[i]=tfpc;
Top20FOM[i]=FOM;
found=1;
}
}
switch(SwitchID)
{
case 0x28882:
printf("\nNIST EC ");
printf("SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC:
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n",
SwitchID,dc,ac,(float)ac/(float)TC,tfpc,(float)tfpc/(float)ac,TC,FOM);
printf("Switches on: S1 S2 S4 S6 S9\n");
printf("Total Switches On: 5\n\n");
break;
case 0x3CD92:
printf("NIST SSLF ");
printf("SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC:
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n",
SwitchID,dc,ac,(float)ac/(float)TC,tfpc,(float)tfpc/(float)ac,TC,FOM);
printf("Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F7 S9\n");
printf("Total Switches On: 10\n\n");
break;
case 0x3CDD3:
printf("SNAC
");
printf("SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC:
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n",
SwitchID,dc,ac,(float)ac/(float)TC,tfpc,(float)tfpc/(float)ac,TC,FOM);
printf("Switches on: S1 F1 S2 F2 S4 F4 F5 S6 F6 F7 S9
F9\n");
printf("Total Switches On: 12\n\n");
break;
default:
break;
}
}
printf("Top Twenty Switches based upon W1=%f W2=%f
W3=%f:\n\n",W1,W2,W3);
for(i=0; i<20; i++)
{
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printf("Switch Rank: %2d SwitchID:%05lX\nDC: %4.3f AC: %d AC/TC:
%4.3f FPC: %d FPC/AC: %4.3f TC: %d FOM: %8.6f\n",
i+1,Top20Switches[i],Top20DC[i],Top20AC[i],
(float)Top20AC[i]/(float)TC,Top20FPC[i],(float)Top20FPC[i]/(float)Top20
AC[i],TC,Top20FOM[i]);
totalsw=0;
printf("Switches on:");
for(j=0; j<18; j++)
{
if(SwitchIMask[j] & Top20Switches[i])
{
totalsw++;
switch(j)
{
case 0:
printf(" S1");
break;
case 1:
printf(" F1");
break;
case 2:
printf(" S2");
break;
case 3:
printf(" F2");
break;
case 4:
printf(" S3");
break;
case 5:
printf(" F3");
break;
case 6:
printf(" S4");
break;
case 7:
printf(" F4");
break;
case 8:
printf(" S5");
break;
case 9:
printf(" F5");
break;
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case 10:
printf(" S6");
break;
case 11:
printf(" F6");
break;
case 12:
printf(" S7");
break;
case 13:
printf(" F7");
break;
case 14:
printf(" S8");
break;
case 15:
printf(" F8");
break;
case 16:
printf(" S9");
break;
case 17:
printf(" F9");
break;
default:
printf("Should Not Get Here");
exit(1);
break;
}
}
}
printf("\nTotal Switches On: %d\n\n",totalsw);

}
return 0;
}
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